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PREFACE
The Corfu Channel incident involved Britain and
Albania#

The event occurred in October, 19l|6 when two

British destroyers were hit by mines in the North Corfu
Channel opposite the Albanian shore*

This

ork, aside

from a chapter on background, is a recording of the events
that followed this incident#
The main limitations revolved around the lack of
understanding the Albanian language.

Because of this,

the bulk of material was drawn from English sources*

Lack

of British and Albanian newspapers limited understanding
of the feelings of the people.

In this respect, the New

York TImes proved especially valuable*

The documents of

the Security Council proceedings as well as those of the
Internat! nal Court of Justice were complete*

Two letters

from the British Information Services were especially
necessary for the events following the

orId Court Judg*

ment*

A.A.B*

*iii*

X Position of ships v;hen the Sauraareg, was hit# The
Mauritug
in the lead followed by the Saumarez# After
tiie explosion the Volage came up to i ive assistance and
was struck at point 6,
Channel that was swept by British Naval forces from
October 19^^ through February, 19^5 and had been declared
free of mines#
Information was drawn from several maps presented in
the Security Counci1 Official Records, 2nd vear, ”3uoolement
Exhibit //•?#
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ALBAÎTIA AMD THE CONFLICT OF POWERS
Of all natlona in Europe« Albania in a senae oan be
aaid to express the greatest abhorrence for central author!*»
ty*

Nowhere la the family solidarity and clan rule more

strictly adhered to than in the hilly terrain of the Al
banian homeland*
The nation is still in the making^ the tribal group*
ings being of more importance than national unity* The
Albanians are mainly divided into two large groups of
tribes; the Tosks, in the South, and the Ghegs in the
North* Both call themselves "Shkupetars”*-^Sons of the
Eaglo." There still exists elan wars and blood feuds*
The "Law of Lek"— an eye for an eye and a tooth for a
tooth— stlll operates as the chief agency of capital
punishment and is executed according to strict rules.
This lar of the blood feud Is not a matter of personal
hatred but actually represents one of the oldest forms
of Jury trial in the world**
A generation of relative independence, however, had
clearly shown the Albanians that the main enemy of their
country was none other than their "adopted cousins* the
Italians*

Since Albanian independence in 1913* the Italians

had followed a policy of imperialism at the expense of
Albania*

They tried to obtain Albania as a mandate after

the war and refused to leave Albanian soil until Internal
resistance and diplomatic pressure forced them to evacuate
in July of 1920.

In I926, the Treaty of Tirana was signed

^Fredrick W* L* Eovacs, The Bntamed Balkans, (New
York, 1941)# p. 47.

-1-

*2*
reeognlzing reelprooal poXltleal interest* of Albania
and Italy*

A further agreement establishing Italian super

vision of Albanian coinage was passed in 1930*

This was

followed by a Commercial Treaty in 193# giving Italian
companies special fishing rights in Albanian waters.

The

climax came in 1939 (April 7) ^ e n Italian troops invaded
Albania and Mussolini proclaimed the territory a part of
the Italian Kingdom*
It was evident that Mussolini looked upon Albania
as a bridgehead to be enlarged at the expense of the neigh
boring states*

This could be done readily by raising

demands in the name of Albania* now under Italian control*
When the Italian attack was launched on Greece in October
28, 19^0# one of the pretenses used was to charge the Greeks
with terrorist activities against Albania*

However* in the

war that followed, Italian troops unexpectedly were beaten
back until Hitler came to the rescue in April 19^1*^

The

division that followed gave to Albania the Kosovo area^ and
the Western fringe of Macedonia, former territories of
Yugoslavia and Greece respectively*
In spite of these annexations which might have appealed
to Albanian national feeling, Italian unpopularity continued
^Yugoslavia fell to the Axis powers only three days
earlier— April li|, 19^ 1--all told, the Hasi onslaught had
reduced both Yugoslavia and Greece to submission in a period
of only IS days*
3 Elevated plain Southwest of Moravia and North of
Vardar coast and West of Pristine, which since the First
ïorld War had been part of the Kingdom of Yugoslavia.

-3to Inoroaae,

Finally» this undercurrent expreased Itself

in the formation of four main resistance movements.

The

most famous of these were the National Liberation Movement
(Leflsje Haeional Clirintare) or LHC and the Rational Front
or Belli Koabetar, The LHC was mainly communist controlled
and was led by Enver Hoxha# Mustafa Faju, and Mehmet Shuhu,
It had the usual program of armed resistance to invaders
and political and social democracy after victory*

The Belli

Kombetar in contrast was led by the more conservative faction
of the Albanian populace, mainly Lef Nose, Anton Horropi,
and their Commander, Mehdi Frasheri,

Besides being less

liberal, it was also more nationalistic*

One of its main

platforms was retention of the two provinces annexed to
Albania in the recent war*
AS news of the Albanian resistance trickled through
to Allied territory, British Military Authorities in the
middle East began to take an active Interest.

Yet, as to

the manner of appealing to the Albanians, the British were
placed in a somewhat awkward position*

Yugoslavia and Greece,

both Britain>s Allies, had lost territory to Albania, and
some of their leaders expressed hope of even annexing added
Albanian territory*

Any promises to the Albanians easily

could arouse Yugoslav or Greek resentment*
Nevertheless the British command decided to establish
contact with the Albanian resistance in order to exploit this
discontent against the Axis powers*

During the early part of

*»ll«»
June, two Brltioh offloera, Bl&Jor Maclean and Captain
Smiley, were parachuted into Northern Greece*
they made their way Into Albanian territory#

From there,
The Britleh

officers soon learned that the two National HeBlstance
Force* were becoming more preoccupied v ith fighting each
other than the Pacelet army#

The British Mission, Instead

of attempting to establish some basis for conciliation,
prudently refused to recognise the differences and attempted
to join all forces under the banner of a "coi^i

: cause#*

With the news of the fall of II Duoe,^ recruits
literally began to pour into the guerilla force*.

A large

part of the country, including such lesser towns as Korchar,
Elbasen, and Berat were liberated#

In September, however,

the German aragr decided to intervene*

The Germans realized

that they could little afford to leave the Adriatic coast
open to Allied landing.

Hence they ordered their forces

in Macedonia to occupy the country.

Then, as characterized

German diplomatic affair* In the Balkans, the Third Reich
aeccKBplished almost a miracle#

Unable to spare many troops

the Germans decided to neutralize the Albanian coast.
Taking advantage of this Internal dissension, the Germans
appealed to the nationalistic ideas of the Belli Kombetar
and convinced their leaders that only through German victory
could Albania hope to hold the two annexed provinces of

"""" ^ (hi July 25, 19^3 , Victor Baanuel III dismissed
Mussolini and appointed Marshal Badoglio to head a new
government#

Kottovo and

ZKaoedonia#

k

Be gene y Connell of three»

made up of the leaders of the Ball! Kombetar was formed under
a e m a n auspices»

The UfC with scmte justification thereafter

began to accuse the Ball! Kombetar of collaboration with
the enemy.
In May 19Ml-f the LHO forces reorganized themselves
on a national basis, and changed their title to the Nation*
al Liberation Army,

Two committees were oreated**an Anti*

Fascist Council of National Liberation and an Albanian
Council, led by Bnver Hoxha, designed to form a provisional
government,

Subcommittees, called National Liberation

Committees, were established for the villages, districts,
and regions liberated.

In theory, they were elected by the

populace but In practice the Sectors and candidates were
inevitably limited to supporters of ^faithful LNG^
At this time the British Military Mission decided to
place its support clearly behind the National Liberation
Army,

Remembering that previously the British had supported

the Ball! Kombetar, the LNG leaders rightly argued that the
British were only interested in their personal gains in
stead of the problems of Albania,
By August, 19^^, it became clear that the Germans
would be forced to evacuate the whole Balkan peninsula.
Contrary to British desires, but characteristic of Com*
munist*led resistant movements, the LNC forces began to
place more emphasis on insuring their control of the

eountry than harassing the enamy*

Thus, when the Germans

âvaouataâ Albania, the LHC with the help of Tito's partisans
gained control of the whole country*

Immediately conferences

were held between the LITC leaders and agents of Yugoslavia
and Russia#

The general introduction of Soviet Ideas and

philosophies then began#

A domestic program to end the

feudalism of Albania's clan system^ and socialization of
all industry quickly followed#
The Western world, although skeptical because of her
pro-Russian policies, continued to hope that Albania would
be saved from the Russian orbit#

On March 31, 1945»

OTHRA^ operations were begun in Albania#

Ro sooner was

the program started than reports arrived accusing the Eoxha
regime of using these supplies for political purposes#
Accompanying this was the refusal of the Albanian Provision
al Government to allow an Anglo#American Liaison Organiza
tion to supervise the distribution of relief supplies*

In

view of this* on April 24, Dr# Laurame MaoDaniels, head of

5 It baa been estimated that prior to vdrld War II,
4/5 of all the land ^as controlled by only 200 individuals#
^ The United Rations Relief and Rehabilitation Ad
ministration created at the Washington Conference in Novem
ber, 1943, to "plan, coordinate, administer, or arrange"
for the administration of measures for relief of victims
of war in any area under the control of the United Ra
tions#

*7supplie* to Albania» announced that aid was being
temporarily disbanded,7
The stoppage of relief aid seemed to have had a
persuasive effect on President Hoxha'* provisional government#
Almost at once the unacceptable Anglo-American Military
Organisation was found acceptable.

Thus, on August 2,

an agreement to renew aid :as signed at Tirana between
Colonel General Hoxha and Colonel D# R,-Oakley-Hill, new
chief of

Albanian Mission*

In May, Foreign Service

Officers representing both the United States and Britain
’«fere allowed passage Into Albania to study the question of
Allied recognition.

Throughout their travels both missions

were received with greatest cordiality.

In autumn of

l^hS$

President Hoxha further expressed his good faith by announcing
that free and independent elections would be held in December#
Anglo-American circles were highly impressed by these
events.

Indeed the New York Times, in an article on

October 17# commenting on future Anglo-American recognition
of Albania, wrotet

"American view of President Hoxha is

that he is not what he has been accused of being, 'a stooge
of Moscow**

Washington is thought to believe that he Is

more of a French Socialist than a Russian Communist,

y The official records give a somewhat hypocritical
reason# They state that aid was disbanded on the grounds
that Hoxha<a regime was not officially recognised. However
aid was resumed at a later date even though the Albanian
government was still not acknowledged#
® Hew York Times, October 17, 191^5#

On November 11, the long exalted Allied recognition
of Hojcha*« provisional government wae announced*

%hlle

the U3SB announced full recognition, we (Great Britain and
United Statea} placed two restriction*;

first, a stipula

tion that all treaties enforced prior to April 7> 1939
should remain valid; and, second, that the future elections
should be held on a free basis with a secret ballot, and
without threats or incriminations to any candidate*9
The elections which followed were conducted in true
communistic fashion.

The people %ere allowed to vote for

any candidate but only the names of the nominees of the
Democratic Front were placed on the ballot*
were phenomenal*

The results

Mlnety-two per cent of the qualified

electors had voted and of these over ninety-three per cent
had cast their ballots for the Democratic Front*

The con

stitutional Assembly thus elected held its first meeting on
January 2, 1946#

One of its first acts was to dispose ex-

King ZoglO and proclaim Albania a sovereign and free
republic*

The constitution adopted was a replica of the

Bussian Constitution of 1936*

The groundwork established.

^ The treaties were of the general type existing
between friendly nations: ex.. Recognition of US Citizens
and "Most Favorable Ration Treaty," 192$; Arbitration &
Concilation Treaties of 192$; Naturalisation Treaty of
January 21, 1931#
Ahmed Bey Zogu who became King Zog in 1927 had
seized power by overthrowing the Orthodox Bishop Fan Noll
in 1924# However in the Good Friday, April 6th invasion
of Albania by Italy (1939)* King Zog and his Queen Geraldine
had fled*

the nov^netlonal eesembly^^ cumulated its work on January 13#
by electing Dr. Omeh Niabami as President, and General
Mehmet Shuhu as minister for Foreign Affairs and national
Defense.

The basis of power, however, was given to Enver

Hoxha by his appointment as Prime Minister#
The inauguration of the new government at once led
to increased friction between Albania and her Western Allies*
The war trials of the collaborators and nationalistic leaders
was Initiated in February#

Immediately the Albanian govern*

ment began accusing the Western nations (particularly
Britain) of offering political asylum to many of the socalled traitors.

Our refusal to expatriate these men

caused the Hoxha regime to use those trials to accuse the
%e@tern powers of sinister Intentions towards Albanla*^^
The relations were further strained by the Greek
Nationalist demands to annex what they called Northern
Epirus but what Albania recognized as Southern Albania.
The British position on this question had not yet been
officially stated.

However, the past policy of armed aid

in the establishment of the Greek government led the
Albanians to assume that the British were supporting the
Greeks*

A further cause of friction arose over the question

.

The constitution was not ratified by the people
until March 12, 19^6,
12
example, in June, 19li-6 one of the 37 accused
Albanians "confessed" at his trial that the British Major
Arnold had suggested the assassination of Hoxha* Hugh
Seton*Wataon, East European Revolution (London, 19^0), p. 226.

•10of the Civil War in Greece*

Albania^ Bulgaria, and Yugo-

aXavla were known to be favoring the Greek Guerilla»*
fhue, when Britain supported the Greeks In the Security
Council hearings, the Russian bloc, led by Ukranlan Foreign
Minister Manuilskl accused the British of fostering this
agitation*
Meanwhile the British Military Mission in Tirana
was restricted in Its travels by the Hoxha regime.

Also,

the British lar Graves Coomisslon, although it had not
completed its %ork, was ordered to leave the country*
Then, when Major Victor Smith, Chief Advisor to the
designated Minister B* C* Rapp, was refused a visa, the
British government retaliated by recalling Rapp and breaking
off diplomatic ties with Albania*
Further friction was caused by the proposal of
Russia and Yugoslavia that Albania be admitted to the Paris
Peace Conference on the Italian Treaty*

The western op

position was sum larized by Secretary of State Byrnes #10
stated that this would be contrary to the Morocco Declara
tion*^^

Finally the Czech compromise that Albania be

admitted as a silent observer was approved*
Another source of discontent arose over the admittance
of Albania into the United Rations,

Once again Yugoslavia

Mr# Byrnes argued that admission of Albania would
lead to a new category of "consultative members” which would
only hamper the work of the conference* He further stated
that the admission of Albania would establish a precedence
and that the applications of Egypt, Mexico and Cuba would
also have to be approved* New York Times, August 10, I9I1.6 *

»xx*
and Bussia advooated the aoceptanoe of Albania#

Both the

United Statea and Britain however vetoed this proposal
largely beeause of the arguments of the Greek Amb&sador#
Viasill Dendramle, who stated, "Albania does not qualify
as a peaee~lovlng nation*"^
The elimax of events came In May when two British
orulsers were fired upon by Albanian coastal batteries#
London litmedlately demanded an apology which the Albanians
refused to give#

Instead they answered by stating that

the British ships were not flying British colors and had
refused to be recognised when so asked by Albanian author
ities#

The British charged unfriendliness and retaliated

by adapting a definite pro-Greek policy in regard to the
Civil ^%r#

In fact, when a spokesman for the British

Legation in Greece was asked to comment on the insurrection
in September, he freely admitted that the Greeks were "still
receiving arms and equipment from Britain" and further
indicated his policy by hinting that, if the Greek Guerillas
became more insistent, "British troops might enter the fight
as a last resort#"^5
The post-war period had opened with an attempt by
both Britain and Russia to lure Albania into this respec
tive orbits#

However the tendency of British agents to

favor the more conservative resistant groups had aroused

% lSewyork Times# August 3, 19lt-6#
York Times# September 26, 19li-6#

*12*
th# auaplelon of the LN(j leader».

This accompanied with

Hoxha*a pro*Sovlet tendeneiea definitely gave the advantage
to Rue3la*

Finally the overall dissension between the

Soviet 0nion and the western powers asserted Itself in the
questl(m of recognition#

We, the Western Allies, placed

two res tr let Iona on full acknowledgement whereas the Russians
game complete approval without any reservations#
Friction was further caused over the question of
H o r t h e m Epirus#

Then, when the '%stem Allies refused

to allow Albania to take part In the Italian Peace Confer
ence, this dissension between Russia and the West became a
naticmal question to the Albanians#

When Albania began

to su port the Creek guerillas and to hasher British
diplomats, the British government answered by breaking
off all diplomatic ties with Albania#

Thereafter, when

the two British cruisers were fired upon, events became so
serious that the question arose only as to when British and
Albanian relations would explode into another front in the
East-West conflict#

The latter incidents and the events

which followed can be understood only within the broader
context of the "Gold War#"

The defiant and hostile at

titude of Albania toward a groat po%er like Britain was
based on certainty of support from the Soviet TTnlon and
pro*Communlst governments in the Balkan states#

CHAPTER II
THE p R E L m i m m r

bout

Th« two Britleh cruiaers fired upon by Albanian
Coatal Batterie* were the Orion and Superb#

Thie attack

oeoured on the 15th of May at approximately 2 p#m.

The

British eruisers had left the port of Trieste and were
heading South to the port of Corfu by way of the Northern
entrance of the channel when the incident happened*
Corfu channel is very irregular in its width#

The

The middle

la approximately 17 mile* wide, whereas the northern and
southern approachers have a width of 1*5 and 6 miles re
spectively#

The eastern part of the channel la part of

the Albanian coast*

However* the western shore Is bor

dered by the island of Corfu which is part of the Kingdom
of Greece#

The depth of the channel varies from l6o-66c

feet with the shallowest points being at the two entrances#
Ocean currents flow into the channel by way of the Southern
approach from the Ionian Islands and pass out through the
Northern Strait between the Island of Corfu and Bento
point of the Albanian shore#
The attack Itself did not prove dangerous#

Only

ten rounds were fired at the cruisers and no hits wore
scored#

Nevertheless the British government looked upon

this act as entirely unwarranted and contrary to the conduct
-

13*

of a friendly nation.

On the 20th of May, the British

govermaant, acting through its consulate In Belgrade
Issued a formal protest to the Albanian government*

In

this dispatch, London asked for a clear assurance that
Albanian coastal batteries would refrain from firing on
any vessel In peaceful times#

Then, after demanding an

apology from the Albanian government, the note concluded
by stating that any vessel had the right to cruise in
open waters on any peaceful mission*^
On May 29th, the Albanian reply %üs received in
London and promptly declared unsatisfactory.
note was anything but an apology.

The Albanian

It accused the British

of being responsible on the grounds that the cruisers
were not flying the British flag and had refused to be
recognized when challenged by Albanian coastal authorities#
Then and only then, the note continued, did the coastal
batteries open fire, but with strict orders to fire wide
of the two ships.

A postscript was included contending

that Albanian sovereignty existed out to a three mile zone
irrespective of the width of the

channel.

2

On June 28, General Hoxha sent another dispatch
to the British government.

As a means of explaining the

incident, the Albanian letter blamed the Greeks for prompt
ing the attack.

General Hoxha charged that the Greeks

^ 2S£IS£2£ n S 2 £ . Say 23, 1 # .
2 Ibid.. May 30, 1 9 # .

-

15^

were often sending ships to shoot at the Albanian shore,
and defended his country(a actions on the grounds that
the Albanian coastal authorities thought that the ships
were Greek,

As for presenting any new details, the Al

banian note merely reiterated the essence of its report
of May 29th.

The note concluded with a statement of

regret but expressed the hope that the incident would not
strain Albanlaa-British relations#3
The following day, the British government announced
that this note was entirely unsatisfactory*

Yet, because

the Balkan situation vas ell ready too delicately balanced,
London decided to drop the Issue and concentrate on more
important developments.
more precarious.

The Greek Civil %ar was beccmiing

Almost daily reports were Issued from

Athens accusing the Governments of Albania, Yugoslavia,
and Bulgaria of supporting the Greek guerillas.

The

situation was further complicated by the Issue of Trieste,
This area, claimed equally by both Yugoslavia and Italy
had finally been designated as a free territory.

Neither

state, however, and particularly not Yugoslavia, accepted
this compromise as final.

Consequently, on the very day

that London announced that the second Albanian reply was
unsatisfactory the British Foreign Office issued a protest
to Yugoslavia,

In this note Britain accused Yugoslavia

of hostile act* designed to annex Trieste,^
3 gay York Times, June 29, 19I4.6 ,

^ Ibid,,

July 2, 1946.

Therefore,

-l6the unaatlafectory Albanian reply waa allowed to remain and
relation* between the two countries continued as auch until
the Corfu, channel Incident of October 22# I9I+6 *
The ships were travelling in typical column fonaa*^
tlon*

The convoy was made up of the Cruisers Mauritus and

I,eander and the Destroyers Saumarep and Vol&ge.
tug was In the lead followed by the Saumares.
and Volage were approximately a mile behind*

0 Mauri*>

The Leander
As the

Saumareg was passing opposite Saranto harbor, the ship
unexpectedly hit a submerged mine*

Immediately the Volage

came up to offer aid® and It in tarn struck another mine#^
Their location was reported as about 3/5 to 1 mile from
Saranto*^

The other two ships, cruising north of 3aranto,

opposite Borsl point were not hit.
had received the severest blow.

Of the two, the Saumareg

The bow had been blown

off by the repercussion of the blast.
suffered only minor damages,

The Volage in turn

A fire broke out on her deck

but It was soon brought under control.

Both ships were

able to keep afloat, and the less seriously injured Volage
took the Saumareg in two and headed for the Port of Corfu,
The new* of the mining of the destroyers electrified
the English populace,

Xsmediately British newspapers and

radio stations devoted top space to the Incident,

On the

^ Saumareg was hit at 2î53 P#m, and the Volage
at ^*16* wEencailng to the rescue of the Saumareg, Security
Council Official Records* 2nd Year, 107th meeting, p,
^ See map for location of ships when hit.

-17/

23rd of Ootobor it was announced In the House of Commons
that at least one officer and thlrty^^aeven enlisted men
were dead or missing#

All told, forty-three enlisted men

and two officers were reported injured#

John Dugdale,

Financial Secretary of the Admiralty, elaborated this
report by further stating that this Incident could be any
thing but an accident#

He referred to an Admiralty report

which stated that periodic mine-sweeping operations had
been held In the channel from October

through February

194^# and had declared the area free of all mines#

?" e

debate that followed substantiated this argument by stating
that for two years the channel had been open to shipping
without incident#?
Meanwhile the Albanian government adopted a "wait
and see" policy#

The Tirana radio acknowledged a report

of a mishap in the Corfu channel, but no further details
were given#

On the 23rd, however, they boldly broadcast

an alleged violation of Albanian territory by British
planes#

In this communique the Albanians charged that

three British war planes had flown over Albanian territory
in the Muzzno-Hsndot area and especially around the harbor
of Garante*®
*Hie days that followed brought no official word
from either government.

Yet, In view of the English

^ Kew York Times, October 2lf, 191^6#
® %bid#, October 2l|., 194&#

premm and radio bulld*up« neutral observers rightly pre*>
dieted that Britain would not allow the incident to go
unanswered#
Initiative in the diplomatic field was unexpectedly
inaugurated by the Albanian government#

Cto the 30th of

October# two official dispatches were sent to the Secretary
General at the United Nations Headquarters in Lake Success#
New York#

They contained charges of an invasion of Albanian

waters by British war ships

and border violations by •'Greek

Monarchists Fascists#”

notes were sent by Colonel

The

General Hoxha^ with a request that the United Nations
General Assembly should Intervene on the grounds that they
constituted a threat to peaceful relations#

The first

letter charged that on October 22# four British warships
had entered Albanian territorial waters "without authoriaa-tlon”^® of the government of Albania#

The note continued

by stating that on October 23# British planes flew over
Albanian territory "with the objective of intimidating and
p r o v o k i n g # H o x h a * s second message reiterated charges
of "Greek Monarchist Fascist** border violations expressing
the fear that these actions

constituted a serious threat to

peace in the Balkans and in

the world#

Security Council Offldsl Records. 2nd year "Sup
plement #S# ** ppt
Ibid## p# lj.6 #
jbi£f» p* 46#

-

19*

The Albanian charge that Brltiah war ships had
violated her sovereignty was Immediately answered by the
British government#

On the same evening London Issued

a communique explaining that the principle of a three-mile
limit of territorial waters did not apply to the case of
the Corfu channel#

This statement contended that, since

this channel la recognized as an international waterway
and is only ij miles wide, shipping and war ships may
travel through it in Innocent passage without violating
national sovereignty#

However the message made no mention

of the accusation that British planes had flown over
Albanian territory*^

To this charge the British Foreign

Office continued to Issue "no comment#"

In fact, on Oc*

tober 31, when Phillip J* Hoel-Baker, British Secretary of
State for Air, was aaked to comment on this accusation, he
merely answered by stating that both Albanian claims were
"unaubgtantiated#*!^

He quickly evaded any further questions

by going into a long speech criticizing the ingraditude
of Albania for British support during the war#
A new charge of an Albanian attack on British war
ships was issued in London on November 2#

The British

Broadcasting Company announced that the 7,270 Ton cruiser,
g a n d e r had been damaged by a direct blow on its superstruc
ture by Albanian coastal batteries#

r

The statement did not

-r^ 'yew'York Timea, October 31, 194&#
U

Ibid.. BoT*mb«r 1, 191^6.

mention either the place or date of the attack but only
that the ship had put In for repairs at Trieste*^

Im

mediately reports began to circulate that.the incident had
taken place in the Corfu channel#

On November 3^ the whole

incident was dismissed as a myth by Capt# R, J# OtwayRuthern* commander of the veasel.

His statement was

verified by United Press correspondents in Trieste who
boarded the ship and reported no damage#^5
Meanwhile# British diplomacy was finally taking
the initiative#

Permission was obtained from the Zone Mine

Clearance Board of the Mediterranean as well as the Central
Committee of Mine Clearance in the United States to allow
the immediate sweeping of the minefield#

Since the British

fleet was the only one available, the Allied Naval Commanderin-Chief of the Mediterranean requested them to clear the
channel#

Immediately the British government Informed the

Albanian Consulate In Belgrade that British mine sweepers
would begin clearing the area on November 12*^7
On November 11, the Albanian Embassy in Belgrade
announced that Albania would look upon this act as a "pre
mediated violation" of Albanian s o v e r e i g n t y . T h e Tirana

I b l ^ , November 2,
^5 %bid.# November 3, 1946#
l6 Security Council Official Records# 2nd year,
107th meeting,^pp. 2^5-296#
^7 New York Times, November 13, 1946*
Ibid#, November 13» 194&*

-21*
government agreed that possibly the Strait might contain
mines» but proposed that first a Joint commission should
be established to Inspect the area*

Only then, the message

concluded, would the Albanian government look favorably
upon any proposal to clear the North Corfu channel*^9
London looked upon this suggestion as only a pretense
to stall for time.

Consequently on November 12, British

ships, ready for any incident began mine-sweeping operations
in the Corfu channel*
the 13th*

The maneuvers were completed on

The same day. Premier Hoxha issued another

protest to the United Nations*

He charged that British

behavior was entirely "Illegal."20

He claimed that the

British had acted without "proper authority"21 &nd that
the mine-sweeping operations were undertaken without the
permission of the Albanian government. In a "brutal and
unilateral "22 manner.
Soviet-led states began to support the Albanian
viewpoint.

Indeed, Borba, the official Yugoslavian commu

nist party organ, charged that the British actions were
motivated only by a desire to prevent "free development of
a democratic Albania."23
14 Security Council Official Records. 2nd year,
'Supplement; #15."^ p.
20 Ibid., p. 50.
21 Ibid., p. 50.
22 Ibid.. p. 50.
23 gew York Times, November 15, 19(^6*

*
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Meanwhile the Albanian government continued to "play
up" the alae*«weeplng incident*

Tirana radio claimed that

the British warships had fired on Albanian shore poeltlons#24
Howevert the British government had not been caught napping#
Foraeeing this possibility, neutral observers had been
requested to accompany the operation.

Their subsequent

reports freed the British of any "hostile acts.*

All

emphasized the care taken by the British seamen in dis
charging the mines#
to explode the mines*

Gunfire was not used from the warships
Instead the British sailors had

used rifle fire from life boats with instructions to fire
away from the Albanian shore*

All told, twenty two mines

were cleared and of these, two were taken to Malta to be
examined by the 2one Mine Clearance Board of the Mediter
ranean*

On the 22nd of November the Board, through its

offices In Rome published a statement of its findings*2$
Evidence pointed to the fact that the mines could not have
lain In the water more than six months*
was based upon three main considerations:

This conclusion
One, there was

no appreciable rust nor marine growth on either of the mines ;
two, grease was still present on the mooring wires
and three, identification marks and paint wore still clearly

Ibld#\ November 20, 1946$
2$ Ibid», November 20, 1946*

26 Security Council Official Records, 2nd year,
" s u p p l e m e n r f ltST * ^ T T W l ------------ ----------
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First official Russian ooiament on the situation wa#
expressed by Trud# the Labor Union newspaper In Moscow,
in *n editorial dated November 26*

In this ocnmentary,

*Trud charged that the minesweeping operations of the
British Navy were one more example of reactionary forces
of the United States and Britain attempting to re-enter
the Balkans through Imperialism*^®
In the meantime Albanian relations with the United
States were also reaching a breaking point#

Our government

had issued charges, as early as September, accusing the
Albanian authorities of violating the treaties In effect
on April 6, 1 9 3 9 * ^

-b continually accused the Hoxha

government of forcefully holding naturalised American
citizens of Albanian nationality*

These demands were

climaxed on November 8 when our State Department asked
permission to send two warships Into the port of Durazzo
to evacuate the American Military Mission#

The Albanian

government had refused this request on the grounds that it
was infringing on Albanian territorial waters#

However,

Tirana had expressed its willingness to allow one passenger
and merchant ship to enter the harbor and evacuate our

I M d »T p# 99* The mines ware found to be of
German 0#Y#ïype# For picture taken during the operation, as
well as charts of the area cleared, see "Supplement # 6 ,**
exhibits 5- 7.

26 New York Times* November 27 » 194^#
29 Ibid## September 27» 194&*

Our 8tat# Department did not look upon thla
as an act of a friendly nation#

Indeed* some commentators

speculated that American war ships had been refused passage
Into Dura%*o harbor for fear they might discover the presence
of ships responsible for mining the area*31
On November 28, a second Albanian note was sent to
the Halted nations disputing the right of the British
warships to clear the Corfu Channel#

Tirana claimed that

the Central Committee of Mine Glearanoe*s consent was not
official because It lacked the approval of the Albanian
government*
London immediately answered this charge by stating
that the mine operations were started only after first
notifying the Albanian government*

Regarding the question

of permission, the British Foreign Office claimed that
the authority rested only with the Central ccKomlttee*
Further findings of the decision of the Central Mine Clear
ance Board were publicized to substantiate the British
position*

The board was composed of four members.

A delegate

of the Soviet Union, United States, Britain and Prance*
All four had expressed their approval of the British request
to clear the channel*

The Russian representative had even

IRT Ibid», November ll|., 19^6*
31 The United States Mission of nine members was
withdrawn on November lo* They were evacuated by the
destroyers Noa and Ferry which stood outside the three mile
limit of Durasse Harter*

pressed for the minesweeping operations on the grounds
that the safety of shipping neeessltated it "regardless
of how the Tirana government might feel about its territorlal waters#"3^
In view of these facts, on December 10, Great
Britain sent an ultimatum to Albania accusing her govern
ment of a "deliberately hostile act#"

The note also

demanded an apology within fourteen days and stipulated
that unless a satisfactory reply was received within this
time the British government would "have no alternatlv©"33
but to bring the matter before the Security Council#

The

message was over two-thousand words long and was strongly
worded throughout#

Besides demmandlng this apology. It

also insisted upon full reparation for the damaged ships
and oompensation to relatives of all the casualties#

The

message concluded with a further statement that an apology
be made for the "unprovocatlv© attack upon the Royal Navy"34
for the incident of May 1$#
On the l6th, the Albanian government Immediately
sent a note acknowledging receipt of the British ultimatum#
The British demands, however, were tactfully omlted froa
the letter#

In view of this, the British government

36 New York Times# January I8, 1947*
33 Security Council Official Records# 2nd year,
"Supp lament #3 •** P# 4i*

34 Ibid## p. 4^*
35 ^4 1 »

The udiole ultimatum covers pages

•*2 6 Immedlately «nnouneftâ that it did not oonaider this note
as a reply*35

A second Albanian reply to the December 10

note was handed to Charles Peak, British Ambassador to
Belgrade on December 20.

In this letter, Tirana expressed

its profound regrets for the accident but rejected all
accusations contained in the note as contrary to the
"peaceful aspirations and purposes so often expressed by
the Albanian government."36

The text was further enlarged

to explain Albanian innocence by hinting that the mines
could have drifted from the Trieste-Pola area which was
known to be still mlne«infested.37

Another point was men

tioned to substantiate British claims.

The note mentioned

that ships had passed through Corfu*s waters for two years
without being hit by mines.

In conclusion, the message

stated that the British were entirely to blame for the
unpeaceful relations existing between the two nations.
This point was supported by various arguments*

British

opposition to the entry of Albania into the United Nations;
failure to establish direct diplomatic contact; November 12
minesweeplng operations; October 23, flying of British
planes over Albanian territory.30

35 Hew 7ork Times, December 17, 191^-6.

36 Security Council official Records, 2nd year,
"Supplement #5*^

P

p

"

37 Main ocean currents of this area seems to dispute
this possibility*

38 Ibid** pp* 1|.1«45*

-27The Britlah Foreign Office immediately declared
that thla new Albanian note waa unsatisfactory,39 However,
London did not lasue any auoeeaaive appeal.

The situation

remained as auch until January 1# 19^7, when Premier Hoxha,
in a Hew Years Broadcast, over a Tirana radio charged
Britain with three violation* of Albanian sovereignty.
The first two were mainly a reiteration of the communique
of October 30 that had been sent to Trygve Lie,

The third

in turn was merely a restatement that the British Mine
operation action of November 12 and 13 had been illegal.
Commenting on the British threat of submitting the Corfu
incident to the Security Council, General Hoxha claimed
that Albania had nothing to hide and would welcome any
Gnited Nations Inquiry,

The message concluded with a hope

for a good year and closed with the statement, **?e wish the
people of Europe, and the British people in particular to
know how their officials are acting towards Albania,
On the I|th of January, the Greek government announced
to London that the Corfu channel waa mined again,4l

Though

the report was not taken seriously. It certainly illustrated
how all sides were trying to confuse the issue.

, that

rumored on July 8

It was

Britain intended to present the

ease before the Security Council,

On the latter day,

^9 Miew^York Times, December 28, 191^-6,
Ibid.. January 2,
Itetfl*. January I4., 19^7.

London «nnouneod that P* If, Synott and Commander %. R. D*
Swoder were being sent to Lake Sueces» to act as special
advisors to the United Kingdom officials.^2

Confirmation

came on January 9# when the British government formally
placed a complaint before the United Rations asking the
Council to act on the case.

Concurrently, Peak presented

another note to the Albanian charge d •affair that the
Tirana reply of December 21, was entirely unsatisfactory.
TherefCM, in view of the failure of the Albanian government
to present a counter^proposal, "His Majesty's government
is taking steps to bring the matter before the Security
Council."^3
On the 12th of January, the text of the Albanian
reply of December 21# and the findings of the Mines Clear-*
ance Commission were formally presented to the United
R a t i o n s J a n u a r y 20, the British proposal was finally
placed before the Security Council.

Immediately the USSR

delegate, Gromyko, raised objections to the placing of the
British complaint before the Security Council.

After

elaborating a long speech of "therefores and wherefores"
of why it should not be presented, he concluded his arguments

Ibid., January 8, 1947*
43 S e c w l t y Council Official Records, 2nd year,

"Supp lament

Pp* 45*46,

44 Sew York Times, January 13, 1947* In reporting
this incident îEey alsostated that a British Admiralty
Source had said that on October 24, a UHRRA ship had been
fired upon by Albanian Coastal authorities opposite Saranto
harbor*

-29by stating that Great Britain had not ezhausted every mean*
of reaching a aettle^^nt with Albania*

The main gist of

this argument was based upon the assumption that Great
Britain# by rejecting the Albanian proposal to establish
a joint commission to Investigate clearing of the channel#
waa acting contrary to Article XXXIII of the United Hâtions
Charter*^5

This article states that all parties to a

dispute should first attempt to settle their differences
by means of negotiations before applying to the United
Hâtions*

Sir Alexander Gadogan, British delegate to the

Security Council answered Gromyko's charge by stating
that the Albanian proposal for a joint commission was not
one to settle all their differences but to deal only with
the clearing of the channel# which he argued# had already
been approved by the Mine Clearance Board*

Sir Alexander

further replied by referring to Article XXXVI of the
Charter which says in effect that the Security Council
may act at any stage of a dispute and recommend appropri
ate procedures for adjustments *4^
The Council then voted on the British proposal.
It passed by a 10-0 vote with the Russian delegate# Gromyko
abstaining*

It was further decided without a recorded

vote that before considering the substance of the Albanian

The United Kingdom presented the case to the
Security Council under the provisions of Article 35»
See appendix*

myO’
*
question» IXbsnls would be Invited to participate without
a vote#^7

The Council then voted» 10#0» with Ororayko

again abstaining, on the proposal of the President H, J* 0#
Makln, of Australia, that the date for the beginning of
discussions should be determined by the president*
was to enable the Albanian delegate to attend*^^

This
The

official Albanian position in the Security Council deel*
sion was made known by cable on January 2!^, by Colonel
General Enver Hoxha*

have the honor to inform you,”

Hoxha stated, ”that the Albanian government accepts the
Security Council*s decision*

llr* Hysnl Kapo will be our

representative, but because of very difficult communications.
It would be impossible to place his date of arrival In
Hew York, and we ask postponement of any discussions
until then*”49
The unprovoked attack of May 15th on the two British
cruisers had been allowed by the British Foreign Office
to subside without any formal apology*

In contrast, British

reaction to the mining of the two destroyers was anything
but passive*

This change of policy can be attributed to

several reasonss

British naval tradition, principle of

the freedcm of the seas, and above all the demands for
^
Rights of a Hon-member State in a dispute*-see
Appendix, Article 32#
48 Security Council Official Records, 2nd year,
9 5 th m e e t l ^ #
!^p# 1 2 3 ^ 1 2 3 *

49

Ibid*, 2nd year, "Supplement #3*”

?• 131*
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retribution for the lives lost#
tainly fair#

British policy was cer

Suspicions were raised in the House of

Commons as early as the 23rd of October, yet no formal
protest was sent until after these accusations had been
substantiated by findings of the Zone Mine Com%ittee
report#

Gromyko did present a good argument when he

claimed the British govermieat had not exhausted all means
of arbitration before sending the case to the United
Bâtions#

However, in view of Albanian attitude toward

the ?,1ay 15th incident, British policy was understandable#
Both in the May 15tb as well as the October 22 incident
the Albanian government was certainly anything but concilia
tory#

Instead of attempting arbitration, the Albanian

policy was primarily one of accusation and counter-chargee#
In advocating the establishment of a Joint committee to
investigate the clearing of the channel, the Albanian
government did present a worthwhile proposal#

Indeed if

both nations would have desired conciliation this committee
might have led to a fruitful agreement#

Yet in advocating

this commission on the very eve that the channel was to be
cleared certainly does not express a policy of atonement#
This accompanied with the fact that the proposed commission
was to be limited to only the question of clearing the
channel cannot be taken as a pretense to arbitrate#

After

all, the basic question was one of bodily and property
damage and not a question of clearing the channel#

The oupport expreaaea by both Hussia and her SatelIltaa through their nevspaper editorial* olearly indicate*
unwavering aupport of the Albanian viewpoint*

Thla,

aeowapanled by the Russian opposition to the British pro-*
pneal of presenting the case to the United Haticoi*, can
tmXy lead to the assumption that the Security Council
proceeding* would be anything but melodious*

CHAPTBR III
SEC0BITT COÜÎÎCIL

immmoM

In #plt* of Albanian acceptance, the question of
the Corfu incident waa not taken up Immediately In the
Uhlted Katlons Security Council*

Worman J* o# Makln,

President of the Security Council, had tenatively set the
28th of January for the beginning of the dissuasions*
However, when the council assembled on the proposed date,
the Albanian representative had not yet arrived*

Sir

Alexander, United Kingdom delegate, thereupon proposed
sending another cable to the Albanian government asking
for the approximate date when Hysnl Kapo would arrive*
Immediately the Russian delegate opposed this overture*
He based his objection on the ground that the Albanian
representative could hardly have completed his preparation*
Sir Alexander answered this criticism by pointing out to
the Russian delegate that his government had indicated to
the Albanian government its intent to bring the case before
the United Rations as early as the ?th of December.

Then,

he continued, Britain officially had informed the govern^
ment of Albania on the 9th of January that the case would
be placed before the Security Council*

Therefore, he

argued, Tirana had had plenty of time to make preparations*
In spite of these arguments, Gromyko raised the question,

-33-

tthoulâ we Indulge in the unnecessary exchange of
telegrame*"^

Oscar Lange, the Polish delegate, ended this

debate by a recommendation to leave this problem up to the
President’s discretion.

The Lange proposal "j^as then

approved, and the first meeting of the Security Council
on the Corfu incident ended#
Similar meetings were tentatively set by the Presi
dent during the remaining days of January as well as by
the succeeding President, 1?, Van Langehove of Belgium,
for the first two weeks in February#

Still no official

word vïaa received on the proposed date of the Albanian
delegate*e arrival#

Reports circulating throughout lîurope

placed Kapo*a vdiere&bouts In Belgrade, Paris, and then
back in Belgrade#

T?lnally, Kapo clarified these rumors

by sending a cable on the 11th of February from Paris
stating that he would arrive in Hew York on the 12th#
Yet the 12th came and went, and still Kapo had not arrived*
On the 13th, however, the Albanian delegate finally arrived
at LaOuardia Field but on a plane from Geneva and not Paris*
^hen asked by reporters what was keeping him, he cheer
fully answered, "Bad Transportation,*2
In spite of this delay, the Security Council welcomed
Kapo with evident relief, and discussions were offically

^ Seeurity Council Official Record. 2nd year,

96th meeting, 'p# li4 #
^

York Times# February 13, 1947*

-35opened on the 18th of February♦

Immediately Sir Alexander

began presenting the British side of the ease.

The speech

which followed was wrathful but quite elegant in its
dialogue*

It was truly an exhaustive presentation sprinkled

with nautical details*

Sir Alexander began by emphasising

that the case in no way should be considered from the
point of view of the mining of only warships*

For, he

stated, the mines could have equally destroyed merchant
ships of any nationality*

After these opening remarks

he followed with a full synoposls of all events that had
happened since the Incident on October 22 as well as a
lengthy discussion on the May I3'th Issue.

Submitting that

the Council must find that the mines had been recently
laid in violation of international law. Sir Alexander said
that the next question was, **^ho laid them?*3

Although

he admitted he could not produce eyewitnesses to the
minelaying, he pointed to an inescapable Albanian re
sponsibility*

He then invited the Council to consider

the wider implications of this case*

For, he said, it

must be clear to all that international peace and security
cannot be maintained "when criminal incidents such as
this are allowed to continue*"^

On the basis of thla

evidence he then submitted to the council four main

1 0 7 th

^ Security Council Official Records, 2nd year,
mseïI25E * P *

ISiâ«*
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eonoXuslona for adoption}
1*

That an linnotlfled minefield was laid in the
Corfu straits by the Albanian government or
with Its oonnlvanoe, resulting in serious
Injury to British ships and loss of life and
injury to their crews,

2*

That the United Kingdom and Albanian Governments
should settle the dispute between them on the
basis of the Council*s findings and that in
the event of a failure to settle^ either party
may apply to the Council for further considera
tion of the matter,

3«

That the Council will retain the dispute on its
agenda until both parties certify that it has
been settled to their satisfaction.
That, since the laying of mines in peacetime
without notification 1» unjustified and an
offence against humanity and since it is the
duty of governments to remove promptly mines
laid in time of war, the Council should remind
all states, whether members of the United
Nations or not, that It is incumbent on them
to sweep or permit to be swept all parts of their
territorial waters where there_ls reason to
suspect the presence of mines

The Albanian reply ^/as presented by î^îysni Kapo^
on the 19th of February,

In contrast to Sir Alexander, Kapo

gave a speech definitely lacking in eloquence.

Before

beginning his oration, Kapo asked sarcastically why the
British request, \^lch ^>is submitted on January 16, 19q7,
had been imnedlately placed on the agenda of the United
Nations security Council whereas the Albanian request of

^ Ibid», 2nd year, 107th meeting, p, 306,
^ Hysnl Kapo was assisted by Nesti Zapo, although
all disouasiona throughout the Security Council proceed
ings were presented by Mr, Kapo,

«
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had still not been taken Into consideration*

0ontliming in this tone, Kapo reviewed the events of
May 15 and October 22#

His Interpretation of events was

entirely different frcmi that of Sir Alexander*

On the

question of minefields he violently argued that Albania
was innocent.

He declared Albania ”• * * had no reason

for laying mines or allowing them to be lald#*^
hinted that the mines could easily have drifted

He then

from

the

Trieste-Pola area*^
The basis of Kapo's main argument revolved around
two main questiona«-territorlal waters and Innocent passage*
Kapo completely repudiated Sir Alexander** statement that
the Corfu Channel could be classified only as an inter#
n a t i m m l waterway*

Although peaceful ships could pass

through the channel, he stated that the nearness of the
Albanian shore clearly classified the strait as a national
channel*

Kapo then asked if one could consider as innocent

passage the parading of warships in territorial waters*
Such passing* he contended* could not be regarded as in
nocent passage*

He then reiterated the Albanian charge

of November 13 that British action in clearing the channel
was entirely illegal*

He contended that* since the channel

was part of the Albanian waters* the government of Albania

Security Council Official Records* 2nd year*

107th meeting* p* 300.
a
This argument was first mentioned in the Albanian
note of December 9# 1946# See Chapter 2* page 26.
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should have b**a consulted first before any such action
vas taken#

Continuing In this mood# Kapo accused the

United Kingdom of misconstruing the facts to suit its
ovn interests#9
In summing up his case, the Albanian delegate listed
two main argumentsî

One, the British government did not

advance any convincing evidence to prove the accusations
that the Albanian government either laid the mines or had
any knowledge of them; two, the British mine-sweeping
operations on November 12 and I3, as well as the events
of May 15 and October 22, proved th t the whole responsi
bility could be blamed on the British government.^®
The debate that followed produced no enlightening
facts#

Mostly it was a reiteration by both delegates to

emphasise their strong points.

However, Gromyko did

heighten the session by adding several remarks#
that the British actions were ”provocatlve**^^
violation of Albanian sovereignty.

He charged

and in

He elaborated this

point by hinting that British actions throughout the whole
incident v/ere prompted by a desire to support the antiAlbanian policy of Greece*

Sir Alexander immediately

answered that these charges were false and accused the
9 February 21, the Albanian government promoted
Minister Kapo to the rank of Assistant Minister of Foreign
Affairs# Hew Tork Times# February 22, 19^7#
Security Council Official Records* 2nd year,

109th meeting, pp# Jiëy-SÏT*
itia*. pp. A 9 .
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Ru8*l&m delegate of mlaconstruing the facts»

A motion

vas then made to adjourn the meeting* and the session
closed until February 20»^^

Thus the discussions that

should have followed with an attempt to evaluate the ease
ended only with accusations and counteraccusations»
The February 20 meeting was cancelled because of
snow»

Yet even this action caused disagreement among the

delegates»

Kapo* ^hen asked to comment on the cancellation*

Charged that he had not been forwarned and had come from
New York on the Long Island Railroad and could see no
reason why the meeting was not held.13
The next meeting was not called until the 21;. of
February#l4

In a sense this hearing was a rehash of the

earlier sessions.
for discussion.

Sir Alexander would bring up some point
Im/aediately Kapo would give an answer and

take the opportunity of bringing a charge against the
United Kingdom.

The United Kingdom would feel bround to

contradict the insinuation and would invariably draw
attention to some other aspect of the case.

Then Gromyko

In turn would feel bound to intervene and tell Sir Alex*
ander that what he said was untrue* absured* and above all*

Ibid,, pp. *7-3^9.
^3 Mew York Times# February 22* 19^7#
During the hearings of the Corfu Channel in*
cldent the Security Council was also scheduling discussions
on Atomic Energy* Former Japanese Mandated Islands {Marshall
Islands* Marianas and CarolInas of the Palau group* etc.)
and Greek Civil l^ar»

«•Ij.O'*
that Sir Alexander "was out of order#
In an attempt to end this stalemate, the Australian
delegate, Haaluok, ultimately recommended that a subcommittee be formed to Investigate the case.

He contended

that a smaller body would be able to reach a conclusion
more easily than the whole Security Council#

The terms

of this proposal vave the committee CŒnplete freedom of
action#

The only instructions were that they should meet

in Hew York City and should report their findings to the
Security Council by March 3.1^

He further suggested that

the subc(%nmittee should be enpowered to request all in
formât 1<% fr<ma both the United Kingdom and Albania#

This

proposal was seconded by the American delegate, Herschol
V. Johnson#

The Russ.- in anr

immediately opposed the motion.

11 ^h delegates, however,

U*

Michalowski, the

Polish representative, charged that the ccamaittee would
accomplish nothing.

Orooiyko continued this argument by

stating that the British case was "absolutely unjustified"
and therefore there was no need for any subcommittee.^7
During the successive days, "behind-the-scenes"
political maneuvering must have taken place.

On the 27th,

the Russian and Polish delegates completely reversed their
Security Council Official Records# 2nd year,
111th meeting, pp.
This date was later changed to March 10 by an
amendment of Chinese delegate, Mr. Quo Tai-ohi.
^7 Security Council Official Records. 2nd year,
111th meetÏKS# P* 3S 6 *'''

opposition by remaining silent when the pecoaraendatlon was
placed to a vote#
adopted

BmO

Thue$ the Australian resolution was

with Poland# Syria and Bussla abstaining#^®

Following this# ll»Khourl# the Syrian delegate nominated
the states of Colombia# Poland# and Australia as members
of the cwmlttee#

Immediately Gromyko# the soviet delegate

supported the Syrian motion#

Johnson# the American delegate#

must not have known of these political maneuvers# for#
when the Polish name waa nomln bed# he objected on the
grounds that the Polish delegate ". # # has expressed
the opinion that the subcommittee couldn't possibly perform
any useful function#

rhen the vote was taken, however#

the United States supported the proposal# and the recom*
mendation was unanimously passed#
The Chairman of the committee was Eduardo Zuleta
Angel of Colombia#

The other two members were Paul Has luck

and Julius Kats^Suohy of Australia and Poland respectively#
The meetings began in closed session on the 2nd of %arch
In the Empire State Building#

The auboommittee proceeded on

the principle that It was neither a committee of investiga
tion nor a fact-finding board but rather a commission to

The member 8 of the Security Council at this time
were: Australia# Belgium, Brazil# China# Colombia# France#
Poland, Syria# USSR, United Klngdcm# United States# Britain
did not vote because It stipulates in Article 27, para
graph 3# on Voting Procedure that a party In a Regional
dispute shall not vote# See Appendix#
^9 Security Council Official Records# 2nd year#
lll|.th meeting#

consolidât» the facta«
meetings#

All told, the committee held ten

Five of these sessions were occupied with question*

Ing the representatives of the United Kingdom and Albania#
The peraanent representative of Greece to the United
Nations# Vaaslll Dendrames# was also oalled In for question*
Ing#

The Greek delegate was drawn Into the dispute because

Kapo# in the course of his testimony# had hinted that the
mines might have been laid by Greece to strain Albanian*
British relations#

Kapo had raised the question# "#ho

could gain by this incident, except areece?*20

The Albanian

delegate previously had not mentioned tils -oint In pre*
senting his case before the Security Council#

Yet In an

atî:empt to evaluate all the facts, Yasslli Dendramas was
called upon to testify before the subcommittee#

He denied

the charge most emphatloally+^l
The rest of the meetings were devoted primarily to
writing up a report to submit to the Security Council#
In this task# the subcommittee found itself completely
deadlocked#

Julius ICatz*Suchy, Polish representative,

seemed to find no evidence to support the British charges#
s^ere*as the Colombian and Australian representatives
could find nothing against the British case#

Unable to

reach a decision by the deadline, March 10, the subcommittee

.. .

N e w ^ o r k Times, March 3# 1947»

See Chapter 1# page 10, and Chapter II, pages 15 &18
for previous examples of Albanian accusations towards
Greece,

requeated mm extension

from

the Security Council*

The

Council granted thia request by postponing the hearings
until March 20*

During this time* however* the subcommittee

still failed to reach an unanimous agreement*

As a

com^

promise the three delegates decided to hand in two reports*
one supported by Australia and Colombia and the second
by Poland,
The two reports %ere submitted to the Council on
March 20*

They were based on a series of questions and

answers*

For the most part* they repeated evidence pre

sented at previous Security Council meetings.

The sub

committee interpreted the case as involving three technical
and legal questions upon which the Security Council would
have to acts
1,
2*
3*

lere British destroyers damaged on the night
of October 22?
Vfere the ships damaged in a minefield that had
been marked as such?
Was Albania responsible or did she know of the
minefield?

Of the three questions* the subcommittee could only agree
on the first.

On the other two* however* there was a

difference of opinion*

The majority report contended that

Albania was responsible for the minefield incident*

It

admitted that proof was not conclusive to substantiate the
British charge that Albania had laid the mines*

Yet in

view of the evidence the report concluded that Albania
must have known that the minefield was present*

The

minority report in turn stated that the only thing known

was that two mines had exploded and that two destroyers
were damaged.

The rest. It reported, “was merely conjecture,’*^^

In the diseuaslons that followed, Julius Kata-Suchy elaborated
this point by saying, **There Is only a British statement
in this respect and as the United Kingdom Is part of this
dispute the statement cannot be accepted as e v i d e n c e H e
then suggested that maybe *the mines were adrift'^ or had
been overlooked in previous sweeping operations*

To this.

Sir Alexander sarcastically answered, *A most miraculous
coincidence,*25

He acknowledged the British charges

against Albanian had not been proven 100;^ but that the
"chain of

© v e n t s

"26 demonstrated conclusively that Albania

had either laid the mines herself or knew they were present.
The Polish delegate answered Sir Alexander by suggesting
that the Council should take no action except to ask
Albania and the United Kingdom to reopen negotiations.
He based this recommendation upon Article Thirty-three,
paragraph Two of the Charter^? arihich calls upon parties of
a dispute to get together and negotiate a friendly settlement.

^2 Security Council Official Records, 2nd year,
120th meeting, i>, ^59^ 5fEe"fu 11l i^porl is~found in SC
Official Records, 2nd year, "Supplement #10", pp. 77^17&
23 Ibid,, p, 558,
Ibid.. P. 559.
25 Ibid.. p. 56o.

^
21

i&ld., p. 565.
See Appendix,

Sir Alexander lauitedlately answered this proposal by
stating that the British government had attempted to settle
the question before bringing It to the Council, but that
Albanian actions pointed to **no chance whatever of negotlating an agreement#**^®

He then asked the council to

atop '^passing the buck** and proposed four resolutions
for their approval*
1.

2*

3.
4,

Finds that a unnotlfled minefield was laid in
the Corfu Channel by the Albanian government
or with Its connivance resulting In serious
injury to Hie Majesty#s ships and loss of life
and injury to their crews;
Recommends that the United Kingdom and the
Albanian government should settle the dispute
on basis of the Councils findings in paragraph I
above, and that in the event of failure to
settle, either party may apply to the Council
for further consideration of the matter;
Résolves to retain this dispute
onits agenda
until both parties certify that ithas been
settled to their satisfaction;
Reminds all states, whether members of the
United Rations or not, that it is incumbent on
them to sweep or p e m i t to be swept all parts
of their territorial waters where there is
reason to suspect the presence of mines

After reading of the resolutions, Bl-Khouri, the
Syrian

delegate made a motion that

taken until the delegates had

time

no

vote should

to

examinethe sub

committee reports*
On March 21, discussions were held on the four
British proposals.

During the course of the hearings, the

Security Council Official Record, 2nd Year,

120th meetingV
29

568*
p. 5 6 7 *

be

American delegate, Johnson, proposed ttro amendments to the
British resolutionst

Although these amendments exemplified

an American pro*British viewpoint, it concurrently typified
a desire for oomprcmilse.

First of all, Johnson suggested

that a preamble be added to point number one in place of
resolution number four, stating, "Considers that the laying
of mines In peacetime without notification Is unjustified
and an offense against humanity *"30

secondly he proposed

that in Resolution I, the words "by the Albanian government
or with its connivance" should be changed to "Flth the
knowledge of the Albanian government*"31
In the discussions that followed, Gr<miyko expressed
the Russian viewpoint by saying that there was no foundation
whatever for the British proposals and contended that they
had not been brought for the sake of malntalnenoe of good
International relations*

Kapo continued this argument

by contending that these proposals only showed Britain*
"unfriendly attitude to new Albanian democracy*"3^
also referred to a Lloyds Reoort33

Graayko

which published figures

to the effect that since the end of the war up to the

29th of February, 19^7, 226 vessies of various nationalities
-r-n n -M

,

" f f e i d

*

*

2tkd ye&T,1

2

1

s t S

l e C

t l n g ,

P *

599

*

31 Ibid*, p* 599*
32 Ibid*, p. 577.
33 Lloyds of London,InsuranceUnderwriters, is
recognised as the largest Insurer of maritime shipping*

.1^7had been sunk In European water» as a result of nines*
Thus, he continued, how could the British blame Albania
without substantial proof*

Sir Alexander sarcaetloally

inquired if mathamatIcIans could prove how two mines could
drift from some other area precisely to the place where
two destroyers were damaged.

Finally as a means of ter-*

mlnating this bearing. Sir Alexander made a motion for
adjournment which was immediately accepted by the Council*^
Discussions were continued on the 2$th of March.
Before the proposal was put to a vote, the French delegate,
Parodi, suggested several amendments.

They v/ere Immediately

approved by both the American and British delegate and put
to vote*

The amended resolutions were not as sharp as

those proposed by Sir Alexander,

Both retained Articles II

and III of the British proposals*

Yet by modifying Reso

lution I to read that "the minefield could not have been
laid without the knowledge of the Albanian authorities”
Instead of *. * * by their connivance," the passage was
certainly weakened#

This, accompanied with the discarding

of the fourth British proposal in favor of the more liberal
preamble of Johnson, made the resolutions milder*

The

amended resolution read as followss
1*
2#

Consider that the laying of mines In peace
time without notification is unjustified and
an offense against humanity;
Finds that an unnotified minefield was laid

.. ' " ^ Security Council Official Records, 2nd year,
121st meetîog, pp. 572*?9T«

3*

i*«

la the Immediate vicinity of the Albanian
coast resulting in serious Injury to two of
His Majesty«S ships with loss of life and
injury to their crew* That this minefield
could not have been laid without the knowledge
of Albanian authorities ;
Recommends that the United Kingdom and Albanian
governiicnts should settle the dispute on the
Council's findings in paragraph II above# That
in the event of failure to settle, either party
may apply to the ccunail for further considera
tion of the matter*
Resolved to retain the dispute on its agenda
until both parties certify that^it has been
settled to their satisfaction#

The vote was taken by a show of hands with the
following results:

Australia, Belgium, Brazil, Chill,

Colombia, Prance, and United States for the resolutions;
Poland and Russia against it; and Syria abstaining#
President then stated:

The

*The resolution has failed to

obtain the affirmative vote of one of the five permanent
members and therefore Is not adopted#**36
Immediately following this vote. Sir Alexander
stated that he would take a chance on the Polish proposal37
and that his government would attempt to negotiate directly
with Albania#

Lange, however, answered that he was with

drawing his resolution because it would no longer **serve
any useful purpose."38

Thereupon the President, Oswald©

35 Ibid,, p. 609,

36 Ibid.. p. 609.
37 gaa page

Chapter III#

38 Security Council Official Record. 2nd year,
121st meeting, p#

-49Araxiha» the Braailian delegate moved that the meeting
adjourn until further notice#
The New York Times, in reporting this event, included
an interview with the Syrian delegate explaining why he
had not voted on the four proposals:

Kl-Khourl stated

that the whole ease revolved around one point*#»when the
mines were laid#

If they were laid during the war, Albania

was not responsible; if they were laid after, he went on,
the Albanian government was obliged to see that they were
cleared#

But unfortunately, "These facts are wanting,

and a doubt existed in my opinion of this case#"39
No further discussions were held on the Corfu incident
until April 3*

During this interval the feeling grew

among the Council members that the case should be sent to
the frorld Court#

This sentiment had been expressed by

some of the delegates even before discussions began in the
Security Council#

Ÿ.arren Austin, the Chief American

Delegate, in conference with Secretary of State Marshall,
on January 26, had expressed the opinion that the case
could best be settled in the International Court of Jus
tice#^®

Also, Eduardo Zuleta Angel, Colombian member of

the Council, in an interview on February 21, hinted that
he would make a proposal to refer the case to the Inter
national Court of J u s t i c e . p r o b a b l y this proposal would
Hew York Times, March 27, 1947#
40 Ibid#. January 27, 1947#
4^ Ibid#. February, 22, 1947*

have been Introduced at the February 2l|. meeting of the
Security Council if the Brltlah delegation had not been
definitely againot it#

Indeed, when Sir Alexander was asked

to commentCR this propoeed motion, he declared that the
ease was below the jurisdiction of the s^orld Court for,
he stated, **The Borld Court Is not a police court#
Thus the Australian delegate's proposal to establish a
subcommittee might have been influenced by a desire to
offset the possibility of the Colombian delegate bringing
this proposal before the Council*

However, on April 3,

shen discussions were reopened. Sir Alexander, the United
Kingdom Delegate, proposed the following motion:

"Re

commended that the United Kingdom and Albania should im
mediately refer the disput to the Internation Court of
Justice in accordance with the provisions of the statute
of the Court."^3
The resolution was immediately supported by the
delegates of Brasil, Syria, Belgium, and the United states.
Indeed, Johnson, when comraentlng on the proposal said,
"The United States Delegation wholeheartedly supports the
resolution."^

The Polish delegate made a motion to post

pone voting on the resolution on the grounds that the

Ibid., February 22, l?^?.
^ 3 Security Council Official Records* 2nd year,
125th meeting, p. 6B5#

kk

Ibid*, p. 686.

•51-*
mübeommltt#* report of March 20 ahould be restudled*

Thla

motion was immediately contested by the Belgium delegate.
He contended that the Polish opposition was irrelevant
to the motion before the oouneil,

Thus, when the Polish

proposal was brought to a vote, only the States of Brazil,
Poland, Syria, USSR, and the United States voted in favor
of the motion whereas Australia, Belgium, and Colombia
voted in the negative, while China, France, and the United
Kingdom abstained.

After the President announced that

the motion had not carried, the Russian delegate, Gromyko,
made a motion to adjourn the discussions until April 9#
on the grounds that he wished to restudy the British
resolutions.

This motion was immediately endorsed by all

the delegates, and the meeting was adjourned,4$
On April 9» Kapo opened the discussions by expressing
his disapproval of the British resolution.

He argued,

"My country has done nothing to justify the British accusations*"46

He urged the council to reject the motion,

charging that the resolution did not merit being taken
into consideration.

For, he said, Albania was not respon

sible in any way, and the Council itself "has no proof,"4?
Sir Alexander answered Kapo by saying the Albanian delegates

Ibid,, p. 687.
46 Security Council Official Records. 2nd year,
127th meeting, p. 72Ô,
hi

Hald.,p.720.

dlsouasions war* *# , * not relevant to this case but
Irrelevant to our previous disousalona*^^®

Colonel W* R,

Hodgson then asked permission to explain his opinion*

He

declared that* If the case had been one hundred per cent
proven* it would never have reached the Council in the
first place*

Commenting further he expressed the opinion

that the delegates had to act on the evidence that was
presented and could not rely on mere “hearsay* of the
Albanian delegate.

He then concluded his oration by

c<Mmaenting on the Russian veto of March 25*

He charged

that there had been "a pronounced tendency on the part of
some members to prejudice the case**49

This he claimed

"* . * prevented a Just and impartial decision from being
reached and so stultified the will of the Security Council.*^0
To this Gromyko answered that the Australian delegate was
suffering from an Illness which he might characterize as
"Vetophobla**^^ akin to the English word hydrophobia.
then added* "I hope sincerely* and I am quite sure that
time will cure the Australian representative of this
i l l n e s s # T h e r e a f t e r the motion was finally brought
to a vote.

The vote was taken by a show of hands with

Ibld..p.727»
^9 Ibld.j%721.
Ibid..0.722 ♦
gl Ibld..P.72S.
52 Ibtd,,p.725.

He

*53*
the following reeulta:

Australia, Belgium, Brazil, Chili,

Colombia, France, Syria, and the United States for the
reeolution; Poland and Eueaia abstained.

Quo Tai-chi,

President of the Council, then announced that the pro
posal was carried.

He then made a motion for adjournment,

and it was Immediately approved by the delegates.
Thus, the hearings on the Corfu Channel incident in
the Security Council of the United Nations finally came to
an end#

The Security Council** action on the Corfu Channel

incident was anything but a success#
started

in

The discussions had

a logical manner-*-^both Albania and Great Britain

were allowed to present their side of the case.

The

succeeding meetings, however, were characterized more by a
desire to misconstrue the facts than to reach a logical
conclusion.
The Australian proposal to establish a subcommittee
and its successive acceptance clearly exemplifies the
Inability of the Security Council to reach a decision.
The subcommittee in turn did nothing but reflect the
divisions in the Security Council.
The pro-Albanian viewpoint of both Poland and
Russia throughout the proceedings was self-evident.

If

any doubt existed, it was certainly removed #ien the
Russian delegate, Gromyko, vetoed the four amended re
solutions#

54 Ibid.. pp. 720-727.

The Western powers definitely sided in with Brite in#

Both the American and French amendments exemplified

the desire of the Western bloc to conciliate and compro
mise#
As s wholey the Albanian arguments were less con
sistent than the British#

Kapo» in presenting the case

before the subcommittee had professed Albanian innocence
by raising a charge «gainst Greece#

Yet in the initial

proceedings» when the Albanian side was presented before
the Security Council» no mention was made of this fact#
In all fairness to the Security Council the pro
ceedings were successful in a negative sense#

The Council

offered a possibility of solution by placing the emphasis
on the legal aspects with a minimum amount of attention
to the political questions involved#

This» acctmpanled

by the time the ease was held up before the Security
Council» enabled both aides to look upon the question from
a more logical viewpoint#

CHAPTBR IV
JÏÏDM^SPP OP THE ÎHTERMTIÜNAL COÜHT OF JUSTICE
Following the decision of the Security Council,
the United Kingdom addressed an application to the Inter
national Court of Justice.

This letter was post marked

May 22, 19^7, and was sent to the Registrar of the vorld
Court, Edvard Hamhro, at The Hague, Hetharlands.

In the

application the British government made the following
claims:
1.

That the Albanian government either caused
to be laid, or had knowledge of the laying
of mines In its territorial waters In the
Strait of Corfu without notifying the existance
of these mines as required by articles III and
IV of Hague Convention #8, of 1907

2#

That two destroyers of the Royal Navy were
damaged by the mines so laid resulting in the
loss of lives of lj4 personnel of the Royal
Navy and serious injury to the Destroyers;

3*

That the loss and damage referred to in y2
was due to the failure of the Albanian govern
ment to fulfill Its International obligations
and to act In accordance with the dictates of
humanity;

4*

That the Court shall decide that the Albanian
government is Internationally responsible for
the said loss and injury and Is under an obliga
tion to make reparations or pay compensation
to the government of the United Kingdom there
fore ; and

.

For Articles III and IV of the Hague Convention,
see Appendix#
-

55*

5*

That the Court a ^ l l determine the reparation
or eompanaatlon*2

In its appeal» the United Kingdom contended that
the Court had Jurisdiction under Article XXXVI» Paragraph I»
of its statute;

« as being a matter specifically

provided for in

the Charter of the United Nations.

This contention

was based on the following points;

le

That
the Security Council of the UnitedNations»
on April 9» 19^6*had reeoatnended that both the
Governments of the United Kingdom and Albania
should refer the dispute to the International
Court of Justice.

2.

That the Tirana government» by accepting the
Security Council's invitation to participate
in the discussions automatically assumed all
the obligations which a member of the United
Nations would assume in a similar case.

3*

That the Charter (Article XXV) laid on members
the obligation of accepting and carrying out
the decisions of the Security Council.^

On May 23» it was officially announced in London
that the British government would be represented by A. E.
Becket» Legal Advisor to the Foreign Office, and Sir
Hartley Shawcrosa.^

The same day, Hambro sent both a letter

and a telegram to the Albanian government informing them
of Britain's application to the iorld Court.

Then, fulfilling

^ The Corfu Channel Case (6 volumes, Leyden, Holland,
Published as follows ; Vol. Ï, 19481 Vol. 2, 19^9! Vol. 3»
1949; Vol. k» 1950; Vol. 5, 1950; Vol. 6 , 1950.) I» p. 9.
3 IMd*»

I. p. 9

^ Ihid., I» pp. 8*9#

For Article XXV, see Appendix.

^ yew York Times, May 2l+» 1947»

*
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requirements of Article XL, Paragraph III,& he sent a
similar message to the Security General of the United
Nations, Trygve Lie*
The official Albanian recognition of the British
application was submitted to The Hague on July 23*?

In

this letter, Tirana also requested the Registrar to bring
an additional statement to the knowledge of the Court*
It charged that the British government, in instituting
these proceedings *, * * has not eomiüed with the re com*
mandations adopted by the Security Council**®

for, it

stated, the British government should have first conferred
with the Albanian government and reached an agreement
before submitting the dispute to the ^orld Court*

Never

theless, the letter concluded, the Albanian government
fully accepted the recommendation of the Security Council,
* * notwithstanding Its irregularity in the action taken
by the government of the United Kingdom to appear before
the Court**9
The President of the Court was Jose Gustavo Guerrero,
of El Salvador*

Since the Court was not in session, he

issued an order on July 31, 1947, to the governments of

® See Appendix*
7 The letter was dated July 2* but was not deposited
with the Registrar until July 23, 1947#
® Corfu Channel Case, II, p* 25#
9 Ibia.. II, pp. 25-26.

-58Brlt&ln and Albania#

By this order he scheduled the dates

for the presentation of their briefs.

The Memorial of the

United Kingdom and the Counter«Memorial of Albania were
to be submitted to the Court by October 1, and December 10,
respectively.
The British Memorial was submitted to the Court on
October 1,

It was a detailed and comprehensive study.

Hot only did it contain a complete list of casualties and
damages done to the ships but a full synopsis of the
Security Council»s proceedings.

Reports were also Included

of the mine-aweeping operations of November 12 and 13,
as well as photographs illustrating recovery and identi
fication of the mines.

In conclusion the British delegate

asked the Court to adjudge and declare the following
points X
1,

That on October 22, 191+6, damage was caused
to His Majesty’s c Ips Saumarez end Volage
which resulted in ; ath“ and injuries to % men
and personal Injuries to ^2;

2#

That the aforesaid minefield was laid between
l$th May 19^6, and 22nd October, 1946, by^or
with the connivance or knowledge of the Albanian
government;

3,

That the Albanian government knew that the said
minefield was lying in a part of its territorial
waters which was being used as an international
highway for maritime traffic|

4#

That the Albanian Government did not notify the
existance of these mines as required by the Hague
Convention No, 8 of 1907, in accordance with the
general principles of international law and
humanity.

5,

That the Albanian government failed to warn his

M&jeety** «hlpa of the danger of the said mines
of which the Albanian government or Its agents
were well aware*
6,

Existence of the minefield in the North Corfu
Channel without notification was a violation
of the right of innocent passage*

7*

That the passage of His Majesty’s ships through
the North Corfu channel on the 22nd of October,
1914^6 , was an exercise of the right of innocent
passage*

8*

That even if for any reason it is held that con
clusion #7 is not established, the Albanian
government is not thereby relieved of its inter
national responsibility for the damage caused to
the ships*

9*

The Albanian government has ccmmitted a breech
of its obligations under International law and
is internationally responsible to His Majesty’s
government for the deaths. Injuries and damage
caused to his Majesty's ships*

10.

That the Albanian government is under an obliga
tion to make reparation in respect of the breech
of its international obligations*

11*

That his Majesty's government sustained the
following damages :
Damage of H*M*S. Saumarez
x
(Total Loss)* « • • • • • * • *7$0,000
Damage of H.M.S* Volage* * • • • * • 75*000
Compensation for death# and injuries
of Naval personnel* « » * • * * $0,000
TOTAL. . .875,00010

On the day appointed, Tirana did not submit a counterMemorial*

Instead the Albanian government sent a Pre

liminary Objection to the British application*

In brief,

the Albanian objection statedt
1*

To place on record that, in accepting the
Security Council's recommendation of 9 April,
the Albanian Government had only undertaken to

The Corfu Channel Case, I, pp* 19“ ^03*

submit the dispute to the Court In accordance
with the provisions of its statute; and
2#

To give Judgment that the United Kingdom ap
plication was "Inadmissible,** because it con
travened the provisions of Articles Xh and XXXVI
of the Court's Statute.

AS a result, on December 10, the President sent a
second order to the British Government.

He requested them

to submit a written reply to the Albanian objection by
January 20, 19li-8.
British circles were anything but pleased.

Yet,

desiring to conform with the Court's will, the British
reply was presented to Hambro on January I9 *

It charged

the Albanian government with "an abuse of the process of
the Court."12

%n conclusion, it called upon the Albanian

government to comply with the terms of the President's
order of July 31 without "further delay."13
The International Court of Justice was called into
session on February

2k§

194#*

The members of the Court

were Laejandro Alvarez, Chile; Jose Phlladelpho de Barros
Azevedo, Brazil; Jules Basdevant, France; Jose Gustavo
Guerrero, El Salvador; Sir Arnold Duncan MoHalr, United

*

Kingdws; Isidro Fabela Alfaro, Mexico; Green H. Hackworth,
U. S. A.; Helge Elaestad, Norway; Sergei Borisovich Krylov,
U.3.S.R.; Charles de Visscher, Belgium; Abdel H&mld Badawl
Pasha, Egypt; Hus Mo, China; John E. Read, Canada; Bogdan
T i Ibid.. II, pp. 9- 13.
Appendix.

12 Ibid.. II, p. 23.
Ibid.. II, pp.

For Articles 3#

4# aee

Winiarakî, Poland; Milovon %orlele, Yugoalavla,

as

the

Court did not have upon its bench a Judge of Albanian
nationality, the Albanian government, in accordance with
Article XXXVI, Paragraph 2,^^

appointed Dr, Igor Daxnep

who was President of the Supreme Court of Czechoslovakia,
Public hearings were held on February 26, 27, and 28
and on March 1, 2 and 5» 194&#

The Albanian government

was represented by N, Kahreman Yilll, Albanian Minister
to Paris, and M, V, Vochoc and M. I* Lapenna, Professors
of International Law,

Britain was represented by Pro

fessors H, Lauterpacht, H, lïaldock, and R, 0, Wilberforce,
Sir Hartley Shawcross, J, M, Jones, and M, E. Reed,

The

Albanian representatives charged that unless a state had
previously accepted compulsory jurisdiction, it went to
the Court of Its own free will.

Consequently, Britain's

unilateral application was contrary to the charter of the
World Court*

Sir Shawcross answered that the Preliminary

Objection was a"flagrant violation of the Resolutions of
the Security C o u n c i l , H e

held that the Security Council

recommendation was binding upon both parties.

Therefore,

the case fell within the compulsory Jurisdiction of the
Court,

On March $, the President declared the hearings

closed,

%

See Appendix for Article XXXI, Paragraph 2,
The Corfu Channel Case, III, p* 63,
Ibid.. Ill, pp. 8-159.

*6 2 *
The JudgjHiefit came on March 25, 194&*

By a vote of

15-1 the Court rejected the Albanian Preliminary Objection*
The dleaenting vote was cast by Igor Daxner.

The Court

held that the reservations contained in the Albanian
government's letter of July 2,

X^k7$

were Intended only

to maintain a principle and in no way substantiated the
Preliminary Objection.

Time limits were also fixed for

the subsequent pleadings according to the following
schedule t
Counter<«Memorial of the Albanian'
Government . . . . . .
15 June, 19^8
Reply of the United Kingdom . . . .
2 August, I94Ô
BeJoinder of Albania. . . . . . . 20 September, X946
The dissenting opinion of Daxner was also included in the
Judgment#

He stated that the British application "was

irregular"!? and "that the Preliminary Objection should
have been upheld."!^

Judges Basdevant, Alvares, %iniarski,

Borlcic, DeVisscher, Badawl Pasha and Krylov, while agree*
ing with the Courtes Judgment, appended the statement by
including individual opinions.

The latter seven Judges

stated that they wished the Court had passed upon the
United Kingdom's claim of "compulsorary jurisdiction of
the Court."

All contended that Jurisdiction depended

upon the consent of both parties, irrespective of the
Security Council's recommendation.

Th« lntern>tlon*l Coyrt of Justice, “Reports of
Judgments
(Leyden, fioileûd, 19^^ ) » P' 45#

Ibid., p. U5.

Immediately after the reading of this judgment,
Yllll submitted to the Court an agreement which had been
reached between the governments of Albania and Britain,
Beckett In turn confirmed this, and the Special Agreement
waa presented to the Court,
between both nations.

This agreement was a compromise

By it Albania and Britain agreed

to submit to the Court the following questionsf
1,

Is Albania responsible under International
law for the explosions which occurred on the
22nd of October 191^6 in Albanian waters and for
the damage and loss of human life which resulted
frcsa them and Is there any duty to pay com*»
pensatlon?

2,

Has the United Kingdom under International law
violated the sovereignty of the Albanian People's
Republic by reason of the acts of the Royal
Havy in Albanian M t e r s on the 22nd of October
and on the 12th and 13th of November, 19l|6,
and Is there any duty to give satisfaction, I?

Following this declaration the President declared the
hearing closed,
As a result of this agreement the Court issued a
special order on March 26,

The order stated that the

special agreement would now form the basis of further
proceedings
The Counter-Memorial of the Albanian rovemment was
submitted to the Registrar on June 15» 19^0#

answer

to # 1, the brief presented six conclusionst

-vr The

Corfu Channel Case, II, p, 29,

International Court of Justice, "Reports of
Judgments / e t o ; “

1*

That the Albanian government has never laid
mlnea or minefields in its waters•

2,

That the Albanian government possesses no
knowledge of the alleged mines*

3#

That the British Claims in connection with
the mines in the North Corfu Channel# especially
as to the time of their presence in the waters#
their number# types# location and removal#
has established no proof against the Albanian
government*

l|*

That the Albanian government is not responsible
to the British government for the explosions#
damages and losses of life which occurred in
the Corfu Channel on October 22, 191J.6*

5*

That the conclusions of the British government
ought to be rejected as being contrary to law
and contrary to fact.

6 . That in view of the odious character of the
British accusation# the United Kingdom ought
to present to the Albanlan government an apology
"in good and due fora*
The Second question was summarized in two main arguments:
1*

That the British maneuvers in the North Corfu
Channel on October 22# 194&* were a violation
of the sovereign rights of the Albanian states
and was especially not "innocent passage."

2*

That the British Navy on the 12th and 13th of
November violated Albanian sovereignty "by the
aide of f o r c e a n d by so doing acted contrary
to Article V of the Hague Convention #8 of

1907*23
The British answer was submitted to the Court on
July 30# 19%^.

Contrary to the Counter-*Memorial it asked

The Corfu Channel Case* II# pp* 30^106.
from p. lOo*

Quote

22 Ibid., II# p* l!|3.

23 Ibid., II# pp. 106-llj.6.
Hague Convention# see Appendix*

^or Article V of the

the Court to Judge end declare the following pointer
1#

Relating to the October 22, 19l|6 Incident:
a] That the passage of the squadron through
the Corfu Channel wa. an c srslse of right
of innocent passage and Inv-i/ed no viola
tion of Albanian sovereignty#
b) That with the exception of the two destroy
ers injured by mines no vessel of this
,
squadron entered Albanian interior waters#^
o) That nothing done by any vessel of this
squadron constituted a violation of any
Albanian right#
d) That the (swept) Corfu Channel is an inter
national highway which is subject to inter
national law of the Hague Convention of
1907.
e) The Albanian notice of Kay, 194^, requiring
foreign warships and mereant ships to obtain
permission of the Albanian authorities before
navigating through the Corfu (swept) channel
is not Justified under international law#

2#

Relating to the Minesweeping operations of
November 12 and 13, 19^6#
a) That the United Kingdom was legally justi
fied in sweeping the channel for mines#
b) That no violation of any Albanian right was
done by any British vessel during the opera
tion of sweeping#

3#

That all allegations made in the Counter-Memorial
regarding passage of the squadrons on October 22,
and November 12 and 13, should be rejected.

I4.# That the government of the United Kingdom has
committed no violation of the rights of Albania
under International law and in conaequenoe^owes
to Albania no apologies or satisfaction."25
The Albanian rejoinder was presented to the Court
on September 20, 19^8,

As a whole it reiterated the find

ings submitted in the Counter-Memorial#

It stated, "The

^ 4 Thisreport stated that none of the ships were
maneuvering in Albanian interior waters and that the two
destroyers did so only after the explosion because of
meohanical difficulties#
Corfu Channel Case, II, PP* 2)4.1- 310#
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Albanian government maintain» the conclusion presented
to the Court In It» Counter-Memorial,*^6
The Court assembled on November 2, 19^ 8, to review
the declarations of the two governments.

The Albanian

government again availed itself of Its rights under Article 31,
Paragraph II.

However, Instead of nominating Igor Daxner,

as in the preliminary hearings, they appointed Bohesulalav
Ecer .27

Public sittings were held by the Court on the

following dates;

9-12, 15-19» 22-26, 28 and 29 of Novem

ber; I-I4., 6-11, 13, 14, and 17th December, 1948*^^
During these sessions, the Court heard arguments
by the representatives of both parties.

The British case

was presented jointly by Sir Hartley Shawcross, Sir Eric
Beckett, and Sir Frank Soskice.

Alganla was represented

by Kahreman Yllll,. J. Nordmann and Pierre C o t , ^

Britain's

case centered around two main point»--that the British

Ibid.. II, p. 313-376.
27

Mr, Ecer was a Doctor of Law and a Professor
on the Faculty of Law at Brno, Czechoalavakia,
For full hearings of this phase of the case, see
The Corfu Channel Case, III, pp# 6-694#
Cot, Pierre, LLD, French politician; b '95;
Radical Socialist Deputy; Legion of Honor, 1914; Under
Secretary in Paul-Boncour Cabinet '32; Minister for Air in
Delaider, Sarraut and Ghautemps Cabinets, '33**’34; Bluai
Cabinet, June *36- June '37, and in Chautemps Cabinet
June '37. Advocater at Court of Appeals; Professor of Law,
University of Rennes, Lecturer at Yale University; Member
Provisional Consultative Assembly 1943, Member of the
Union of Progressive Republicans and of French Association
for the United Nations.

m()ym
squadron had not violated Albanian sovereignty and that
tha mines eouXd not have been laid without the knowledge
of the Albanian government»

These arguments were eup*

ported by testimony of the Ctmmanders of both the Volage
and Sumareg as well as the Captains of the Cruisers W a n d e r
and Mauritius*

All of these officers stated that the

ships were passing through the channel in innocent passage*
They further testified that the guns on all four of tae
ships were unloaded and not aimed at the Albanian shore*
Pierre Cot answered by claiming that the British ships
had been maneuvering in forbidden waters*

He then presented

to the Court a series of documents to substantiate this
fact*

The documents contained observations of the Albanian

coastal authorities for the day of October 22, 19l|^6*

Besides

sustantiating this point, the statement also chained that
the ships were carrying a supplement of soldiers,

Bir

Hartley denied this charge by presenting evidence that
showed that the ships were only carrying their normal
marine detachments *

He then twisted the Albanian evidence

to support the British case*

For he stated. If the Albanian

coastal authorities could pick out marine detachments, how
could anyone mine the channel without their knowledge?
Sir Hartley then introduced Lieutenant Commander
Karol Koraolteh, a former Yugoslavian Haval

Offleer,30

Kovaoltch had fled on July 19, l?!^?
in a sailing dinghy to Italy and had been granted political
asylum.

Hit teatlmony w«t probably the most startling of the nhole
session, in so far as It provided testimony regarding the
responsibility for the laying of the mines#

The absence

of any such proof was the weakest link in the British ease#
This proof was furnished by the testimony of Commander
Kovacitch#

Before introducing the witness# Sir Hartley said#

•Our ease is against Albania and not Y u g o s l a v i a # m e n
the witness was called to the stand# Sir Frank asked him
to relate his knowledge of the mine lay ing*
Commander Kovacitch stated that on October 17# he
had observed mines b e i % loaded aboard the Yugoslavian
ships Mljet and Meljlne#

Later after inquiry among their

officers he had learned that the ships had been involved
in a minelaying operation#

Immediately after this testi*

mony# Pierre Got# asked permission to question the witness.
He conducted his cross examination in such a way as to
question the Commander’s character#

He asked Kovacitch

whether or not he was a deserter from the Yugoslavian
Havy#

Comaander Kovacitch was forced to answer yea,

Pierre

Cot then presented to the Court an official oomminique
from the Yugoslavian government*

This note denied Com

mander Kovacitoh’s testimony completely and further stated#
•That there are no such ships in the Yugoslavian

N a v y .

*32

Joseph Hordiaann then took over the Albanian case#

Corfu Channel Case# III# p, 2]|0*
32 Ibid.# V# p# 99#
PP* 99*101#^

For complete comminique see

H# stated that It was absured to say that Albania would
aommlt suoh a foul act#

"Albania has no Navy, no Air

Fora#, and only a very small Army.

I'ho can possibly be

lieve that such a country would embark upon such an ad
venture in the course of which it might lose its inde
pendence."^^

He then brought out the charge that Greece

a l ^ t be the culprit.

For he stated, "Had not the Greek

government the greatest interest in increasing the tension
between Britain and Albania,"3^
Pierre Cot stressed the point that the British
maneuvers of October 22, were not innocent passage, but
rather, " . . .

it was a mission to see whether the Albanian

government would behave itself or fire once more as it
had done the previous May.*35

then reiterated that the

guns of the ships were aimed at the Albanian shore.

Sum

marizing the Albanian position, he stated, "The truth is
simply that the warships sought to impose by force the
British Government's own interpretation of innocent passage."3^
After this conflicting testimony the Court was placed
in an awkward position.

If it were to accept the evidence

Ibid., Ill# P* 312.
^

Ibid.. Ill# p. 33l^<
Ibid.# Ill# p. 390.
Ibid.. Ill, p.

koQ.

submitted by the British, It would have no choice but to
Judge Albania guilty.

If It were to accept the Albanian

viewpoint, British charges must be completely false.

la

an attempt to evaluate the evidence, the Court appointed
a committee of experts Including the following;

Lieutenant

Commander S. jr. W. Biff ©rich of the Royal Netherlands
Navy, Commodore S. A. Forahell of the Royal Swedish Navy,
and Commodore jr. Bull of the Royal Norwegian Navy.

The

order was issued on December 17, 19^#, and stated;

"Cer

tain pointa have been contested between the Parties which
make it necessary to obtain on expert opinion, *37

There

upon the President declared the hearings closed and post
poned any further sittings until January 17, 1949#
The report of the Cmnmlttee of exports was sub
mitted to the International Court of Justice on January 8,
1949*

The terms of the December 17th offer had asked the

experts to answer several questions.
"unanimous,*
1.

Their answers were

Among the questions were:

How effective was the mine clearance carried
on by the Royal Navy In 1944^
That the sweeping of a moored minefield if
carried out in the proper v/ay can be considered
100;^ safe.

2.

Were the ships hit by floating mines?
The nature of the damage sustained by the
Saumares and Volage excludes the faintest
possTfcllity of its cause being a floating mine.

3^ International Court of Justice# "Reports of
Judgments, etc., 19i|-t**4^, PP# * % - 1 2 7 #
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3«

%hat type of mine# struck the vessels?
Dftmege must have been caused by the explosion
of a moored contact mine of approximately
600# charge#

4*

the mines moored before or after

ZZ

October.

1946?
With nothing more than general information
all we are prepared to state with certainty is
that the mines could not possibly belong to a
minefield laid during the war,*3"
In view of these findings the Court issued a subsequent
order on January 17* to the Cixamittee,

By this order the

three experts were requested to proceed to the North
Corfu Channel and **conduct firsthand observations#"39
The report of this investigation was submitted to the
Court on February 8# 19^1*9*
ling#

Its findings were quite start

The experts considered it to be "indisputable"

that* if look-outs were equipped with binoculars# "The
minesweeping operations shown in the United Kingdom Memo
rial must have been noticed by these coastguards,"^^
They stressed the point that look-outs on Cape Kiephali,
Benta Point and San Giorgio Mongstary could not help but
notice the mine laying.
The hearings were again opened on January 17 and

International Court of Justice# "Report of
Judgement a# et c .* 1%^!*" PP* lljS-XSl*
39 Ibid.. p# 151#

40 Ibid,* pp. 152- 161. Quote is from page 161,
Commander BuTT did not take part in this Investigati<WEi
because of illness.
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continued on through the 22nd,

Proceedings during this

time were primarily a reiteration by both sides present^
lag the highlights of their case,

Soskice, representing

the British government summarized the British case by
stating!

"The Albanian government *a case should be re-»

garded as one which is indeed difficult to support
Pierre Cot answered this by saying, "The decisions of the
Government of Albania are legitimate,

Thereupon, the

President, on January 22, called the hearings closed and
the Court withdrew into closed session,43
On April 9, 1949# the Court, in full session, de*
livered its Judgment,

The Court held, by 11 votes to 5,

that Albania was responsible for the explosions of the
two destroyers on the 22nd of October 1946#

By 10 votes to

6 , the Court reserved for further consideration the assess
ment of the amount of compensation.

On the question of

the British violation of Albanian sovereignty, the Court
voted l4-2

that the United Kingdom did not violate

Albanian sovereignty on the 22nd of Cctober, 1946,

However

the Court held unanimously that the British government had

The Corfu Channel Case, IV, p. 497#
^

Ibid.. IV, p. 683,

President Guerrero was ill and the Vloe President,
Judge Basdevant acted as President during the hearings
of January 17*22, On February 26, 1949, J^dge Basdevant
was elected President and Judge Guerrero, Vice-President,

•73violated Albanian aoverelgnty on the 12th and 13th of
November
On the firat point the Five Judges who did not agree
with the majority's findings were:

Judges Bogdan felniar-

akl of Polandjp Abdel Hamid Badawl Paaha of Egypt, Surge
Borlaoultch Drylov of the Soviet Union, Jose Philadelphie
de Asevedo of Brasil, and Buhunalav Beer of Gseehoalovakia#
Bach of these Judges added a statement of their individual
opinions#

They insisted that the facts were not conclusive

enough to substantiate the question of "Albanian know*
ledge»"

Judges Bogdan Wlniarski of Poland, Abdel Hamid

Badawl Paaha of Egypt, Surge Borisouitch Krylov of the
Soviet Union, Jose Philadelphio de Azevedo of Brasil,
Guhuslav Ecer of Czechoslovakia and Basdevant, of France
voted in the negative on the second point#

They all

contended that the Special agreement asked the Court only
whether Albania was or was not to pay compensation and not
to assess the amount#

Judges Krylov of the USSR and

Azevedo of Brazil oast the negative vote on the third
issue*

They concluded that the British Navy, on October 22

had violated Albanian sovereignty*

as

stated previously,

the Judges were unanimous on the British actions of Novem*
bar 12 and 13*

In this opinion the Judgment stated that

British actions were an intervention of Albanian sovereignty

^ This mine sweeping operation was referred to
In the World Court proceedings as "Operation Retail*"

-71^and can be looked upon "as a laanlfeatatlon of a policy
of fore© «**^5

Commenting on this point It added, "For

from the nature of things. It would be reserved for the
moat powerful states and might easily lead to perverting
the Administration of International J\:tloe."^&
After the presentation of this Judgment, the Court
presented an order to the Governments of the United Kingdom
and Albania*

By this order the t^o governments were asked

to submit briefs for the assessment of compensation.

The

time limits were as follower
June 25, 19^9 • • • Submission by Albania of its
observations on amount demanded
by the United Kingdom.
July 2$, 1949 • • • Submission of the United Kingdom
reply.
,
August 25, 19*4-9 * • Submission of Albanian reply.^*
The Albanian viewpoint of this judgment was expressed
in a radio broadcast reported by the New York Time a.

In

this commentary, Tirana stated, "Judgement was unjust and
nonsense."

It further elaborated this point by quoting

the Albanian newspaper, Bashklml.
written that the " . . .

This newspaper had

Incident of the Corfu Channel was

an act of provocation against Albania concocted by British
Imperialists with a view of realizing definite ends with

International Court of Justice, "Reports of
Judgements, Etc.," 194^# P# 3^*
Ibid., p. 35. The judgement of April 9# 1949,
as well as "Elasentlng opinions. Pp. 4~131*
Ibid.. pp. 171- 172.

-75regard to our Country#**^®

The 25th of June oazne and no

word wad received fr(xn the Albanian government*

However,

on June 29, a letter was deposited with the Registrar.
This note completely repudiated the right of the Court to
assess the amount of compensation.
stating that Albania ”. . .

The letter ended by

sees no need for including

such information."^9
In view of this, the Court issued another order of
June 29»

This order extended the time limits for the

subsequent declarations.

The deadline for the Albanian

observation was changed to July 1, the United Kingdom
reply to August 1, and the Albanian reply to September 1.
In spite of this the Albanian government still failed
to submit any declaration.

The British reply, however,

was submitted to the Court on July 28, 1949#

It listed

the following damages t

^

In respect of H.M.S. Saumarez • .
In respect of H.M.S. Volage . * .
In respect of deaths and injuries
Havy personnel . .
...

« , « «
. . . .
of
.
##

700,007
93,812
^
go
5_Q^_Qk8
8%j,9k7

On September 30, the Registrar, Hambro informed the
British and Albanian governments that public hearings

Hew York Times, April l6 , 1949#
^9

Corfu Channel Case, II, P# 400#

50 tbid-. II. D. 394*

declaratlo^;j Pp: 390-394#

For the complete British

-7 6 would begin on November I 7, 191^.9,51

spiU

of this

letter no word was received from the Albanian government*

€xk November

15 however, a telegram was received from

Tirana roexpressing the opinion of the letter of June 29*^2
Although no Albanian Consuls were present, the
hearings began on the designated day*

The Court heard

statements by Sir Eric Eeckett and Sir Frank Soskice*
They asked the Court to invoke Article 53 of the Court
Statute*

According to this Article, when one party does

not appear before the Court, the other party may call upon
the Court to decide in favor of its clalm#^^
After this request. Judge Krylov asked Sir Trie,
**If the Albanian government tried to approach you with
the Intention to come to the settlement of the question
of conpensation***^

Sir Eric answered that he had received

a letter from the Albanian government*

But he continued,

replied to that letter on the 12th of September and I
would like to read to the Court one sentence from my reply—
tThat the procedure before the Courtshould
rupted and that the Court must be left

not

togive its

be Inter
judgment

IbldT, V, p. 286*
^2

Ibid.* V, p. 288*
See Appendix for Article 53#

The Corfu Channel Case, Iv, p* ?06* For complete
procedure of tBle liearing,see pp* 702-712* These facts
are presented as euèh for, except for this hearing I did
not come across this information*

-
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on the amount of damages.»*’ K© further acknowledged that a
similar letter had been received on October If, but added,
"ITe again said we wished the proceedings before the Court
to continue*"55

After this questioning, the President

announced the hearings closed.

On Kovember 19, 19lf9, the

Court appointed a Committee to evaluate the British Claim*
The members were Bear Admiral J. P. Berck of the Royal
Netherlands Navy and Mr. G. deRooy, Director of Naval
Construction in the Royal Netherlands Navy,

The findings

of these experts were submitted to the Court on December 1,
1949*

The report completely justified the British claims,

"as a fair and accurate estimate of the damages sustained.
The Court assembled on December 15, 1949 and formally
presented its judgment.
British D0clarat|on*57

By a vote of 12-2 it upheld the
The dissenting votes were cast by

Judges Krylov of the 0SSR and Ecer of Czechoslovakia*
Judge Krylov did not present a dissenting opinion, but
Ecer did.

Ho stated that the British Claim did not take

into consideration the question of depreciation; therefore.

Vice President, Guerrero was acting President
since President Basdevant was in New York representing
the Court in the General Assembly,
56 International Court of Justice, "Reports and
Judgements, etc., 19497 PP*
This committee only
evaluated the damages to the ships. As far as compensation
for the dead and wounded, the Court accepted the British
Documents,
57 The President, M. Bastevant was representing the

Court at the United Nations General Assembly whereas
Judge Eabela was unable to be present for reasons of
health. The Corfu Channel Case, IV, p. 702,

*
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the amount awarded to the United Kingdom was altogether
too high#

He then closed his statement by saying that the

Judgment "* # * rejects the rule that a sum In respect of
depreciation must be deducted from the building cost without
assigning any reason In law for doing so#

%hat would be the

effect of this principle in practice is a matter of cal
culation#*^®
In spite of the Courtes decision no word was re
ceived from the Albnaian government*

Therefore, on January 18,

19?0, the United Kingdom sent a note to the Albanian govern
ment asking for payment#^9

The British letter was answered

on March 1I4,, 1950 when the Albanian government announced
its willingness to enter negotiations for payaent#^^
Discussions were opened on April llj., in Paris*

Behar

Shtylla and Sir Eric Beckett of Albania and Britain respec
tively led the two delgations#

As a sign of concilliation,

Shtylla offered to pay 1|0,000 Founds for the casulaties#®^
Yet in spite of this offer, the Albanian legation refused
to commit itself as to whether Albania accepted the Court#*
^ 3 6 International Court of Justice, ^Reports of
Judgements, etc#,"
p# 2577 For complete Judgement
see pages 244*257*
59 This information was obtained in a letter sent
to Arthur A. Bennett from the British Information Service
on August o, 1953*

60 British Information Service Letter, August 6,
1953, p. 1
The British government has not received any
compensation from the Albanian government. British Informa
tion Service letter to Arthur A# Bennett, September 24» 1953*

-

liability under the award*

79-

Thus, on June 29, 1951, Sir

Ernest D&viee, Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affaire,
announced in the House of Commons that the dl eussions
had closed without any agreement
After this failure no direct actions &ere attempted
by either side*

British hesitancy to press the issue was

well stated in a comaent made by Sir Davies in the House
of Commons on March 1, 1951*

%hen the question was asked

on Albanian failure to pay. Sir Ernest stated:
Albania is a country which is no larger than ?ales
and has a population of only a little over one million.
There is no record of any trade with the United King
dom at the present time and before the war the trade
was roughly only 6,000 Pounds a year, vthlch is obviously
negligible* It has no assets abroad or assets known
to be transferable. « • * Perhaps It is not out of
place to say also that the Albanian Government happens
to be a Communist Government who do not respect the
rule of law or the principles of international law
as do the western democracies. ^
Meanwhile it became known that Albania could raise
a claim to specific foreign assets in gold.

% e n German

troops evacuated Rome in 19l|3# they had taken with them a
gold reserve valued at |2,600,000.^^

Previously, in 1939#

Italian occupation of Albania had been accompanied with
the movement of Albanian assets to Rcme,

How therefore,

both Albania and Italy claimed the gold reserve which was
5j»itfiiin Information Service letter of August 6,
1953# P# 1.
^3 Ibid., p. 2.
61*. The background of this German looting as well as
the amount was presented in a Hew York T_imes comment on
May 2, 1951#

d e a t i æ û to bo returned to Ita rightful oimers*

The three

nation* responaibXe for this disbursment were the United
States, United Kingdom and France*

Thus, on April

2$,

1951»

the three powers agreed to ask the International Court
to name an arbitrator to rule on the conflicting claims.
The three governments further agreed that if Albania were
awarded the decision, the gold would be delivered to Britain
in partial satisfaction of the Court** Judgment *. . .
unless within 90 days from the date of the arbitrators*
opinion, either country makes applicatloa to the Inter
national Court against this d e c i s i o n . A n arbitrator
was chosen by the International Court and a meeting of
the representatives of Albania and Italy was held in
Brussels, Belgium, on November 5, 1951.^^

The oral hear

ings took place in September, 1952, and on February 20,

67
1953 the gold was awarded to the Albanian government*^'
Selwyn Lloyd, Minister of State commented in the House
of

Coms&onB

on April ig, 1953» that he hoped the gold would

now be given to the British government*^^

However, on

June 10, 1953 it was announced in the House of Commons
that the Italian government had appealed the arbitrators*

'

British Information Service letter of August 6,

1953.
66 Ibid., p. 3.
67 1,90, e U ,
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Loo * pit *

«•0X*.
deelelon to the International Court of Justice,
The %orld Court proceedings may be divided into
three main phases— ‘Albanian preliminary objection, Judg**
ment on the special agreement, and the decision on the
amount of compensation.
a draw.

The first part was scmiewhat of

The Court upheld the British application but

not on the grounds of the Security Council resolution,
but rather because of the Albanian letter of July 2, 191^8,
The second question or the real core of the case
was viciously contested by both sides.

The Court was

confronted with a ma&e of conflicting evidence.

Being

unable to Judge which facts were right, the Court appointed
a eoaiaittee of experts to evaluate the testimony.

These

experts completely upheld the British contention that
"the mines could not have been laid without the knowledge
of the Albanian government,"

On the report of these experts,

the Court Judged Albania guilty.

Yet showing Its thor*

oughness, the Court also ruled that British action in
sweeping the channel was illegal and a "manifestation of
a policy of force,"
The amount of compensation was not even contested
by the Albanian government.

Yet the Court's fairness was

exemplified in the nominating of a Committee of experts
to evaluate the British claim.

Then and only then did

^9 British Information Service letter of August 6 ,

1953t P* 3.
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the British amount*

the voting was not on East and West lines*

Of the

Wiole Court only the Judges of Albania and the USSR voted
eonslatently for one side#
Since this time, however, the British government has
not sons latently or strongly pressed Albania for payment*
Thus, It may be Inferred that Britain was more interested
in upholding the principles involved than the receivement
of payment*

Yet, the willingness of Albania to make a

token payment represents a concession to the British view
point in the dispute*

CHAPTBH V
CONCLUSION
The bickering end melodrama that accompanied the
Corfu Channel Incident were certainly overplayed*

If both

sides had truly desired to negotiate, the event could have
been easily settled in a matter of weeks,

Albanian actions

were spurred more by a desire to raise Insinuations and
counter charges than to settle the dispute*

Britain in

turn, although somewhat more tactful, was just as uncom
promising*
its actions*

Nevertheless, each aide had good reasons for
British policy during the war of supporting

the more conservative resistance groups had aroused the
suspicions of the Hoxha regime*

In view of the existing

pro-Greek policy of Britain, the Albanian nation could
not help but look upon the United Kingdom as the instigator
of Greek demands for Southern Albania*

Albanian relations

with Britain both following the war and up to the incident
itself were definitely unfriendly*

Thus this friction

was responsible for the momentum of this incident even
though peace existed between the two nations#
The most outstanding feature was the Hast-Vest con
flict*

Albanian aggressiveness would be difficult to

explain except in the light of the fact that she was an
ally of Russia*

If she had not been certain of Russian
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support her attitude would no doubt have been different.
In the eame light, Britain could have been more forceful
if she would have had to deal only with Albania.

Instead,

the British government did not officially protest until
the charges had been substantiated by the findings of the
Zone Mine Clearance report.
The Security Council’s failure in this case can
certainly be blamed on the East-Best schism.

The Eastern

bloc, represented by Russia and Poland never once deviated
from their pro-Albanian viewpoint*

The Western bloc, in

turn, although definitely pro-British, did attempt to be
somewhat impartial.

The amendments of both France and

the United States to the British resolution exemplified
the desire of the Western bloc to compromise.
The voting however, except for Syria, was definitely
along the East-West lines.

It is true that when the Polish

amendment was voted on in the April 3 meeting, the United
States and Brazil voted with Russia.

However, the opposi

tion of the other states was not against adjournment but
against the Polish reasons for adjournment*

For when the

Russian delegate asked for postponement in order to restudy
the British resolution, all the states unanimously approved.
Thus the voting of Brazil and the United States cannot
be taken as a true test of East and ^est lines.
The Security Council did not acccanplish its end.
The case was still not settled.

Yet la emphasizing the

legal aapeate of the eeae, and the paeelng of the proposai
to aend the Incident to the %orld Court, the Security
Council did make progress*
The ^orld Court did an admirable job.

It was con-

fronted with more conflicting testimony than the Security
Council,

In spite of this, the Court evaluated the case

and presented a judgment.

As for the proceedings, the

hearings were certainly impartial#

The Preliminary Albanian

Objection was settled before any attempt was made to Judge
the issue.
their case.

Both sides were given ample time to present
Because of the mase of conflicting testimony,

the World Court did not attempt to judge the facts until
they were first evaluated by an impartial board of experts#
The fair attitude of the Court is particularly evident in
the third phase of the case~~the question of compensation
to the United Klngd<wn,

In view of Albanian failure to

present a counterdeclaration, an order was issued on July 29,

19^9 extending the time limits for the briefs#

Then also,

the Court did not accept the British figure until experts
had first audited the amount.
The Court«S voting was not on East and west lines#
Of all sixteen members only the Judges from Russia and
Csechoelovakia voted consistently for one side#

The

unanimous judgment that the British government, on November
12 and 13 had violated Albanian sovereignty la both a credit
to Britain and to the Court as a Waole#

The throwing out

-86*
of the teatimoay of OoDsaander Kovaoitlch on the grounds
**that ttot enough facts arc available"^

la also a compliment

to the thoroughness of the International Court,
In comparing the success of the
failure of the Security
into consideration.

orId Court and the

Council, one fact must be taken

In the World Court no state baa the

veto power as is the case with the permanent members in
the Security Council,

The World Court, moreover, was

free to decide the issue on the basis of existing evidence,
undisturbed by political consideration.

Hence the World

Court was able to pronounce a judgment*
The ability of the judges as a whole to separate
themselves from their nationalistic Ideas and to judge
the case by its merits is certainly a credit.

The Judges of

Yugoslavia, Poland, United States, France, and Britain, etc,,
did not vote straight national tickets.

Neither the

minutes nor the judgments ever mentioned the nationality
of the members.

In the Security Council, however, the

countries names are recorded in the voting, instead of the
names of the individuals.
The time element cannot be overlooked in evaluating
the success of the W r l d Court in the Corfu affair.

The

passing of the months into years allowed both sides to
approach the issue from a more logical viewpoint,

Britain*a

sense of grievance was appeased by the Court *s favorable

^ International Court of Juatlee. "Reports of Judgmanta» #te«y
p, it.
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Tbut an incident that was not worth the risk of
war has, for all practical purposes, been taken out of
the headlines#
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APPBSCDIX

A?PEîîDIX Â
ARTICLES OF THE CHARTER OF THE UNITED HATIONS
article

XXVII;
1#

Each member of the Security Council aiiall have
one vote,

2.

Deolalone of the Security Council on procedural
matters shall be made by an affirmative vote
of seven members,

3«

Decisions of the Security Council on all other
matters shall be made by an affirmative vote
of seven members including the concurring votes
of the permanent membersj provided that, in
decisions under Chapter VI, and under paragraph
3 of Article 52, a party to a dispute shall
abstain from voting.

ARTICLE XXXII!
Any Member of the United Rations which is not a
member of the Security Council or any state which
is not a Member of the United Rations, if it is a
party to a dispute under consideration by the
Security Council, shall be invited to participate,
without vote, in the discussion relating to the
dispute. The Security Council shall lay down such
conditions as it deems just for the participation of
a state which is not a member of the United Nations,
ARTICLE XXXIIIs
1,

The parties to any dispute, the continuance of
which is likely to endanger the maintenance of
international peace and security, shall, first
of all seek a solution by negotiation, enquiry,
mediation, conciliation, arbitration. Judicial
settlement, resort to regional agencies or
arrangements, or other peaceful means of their
own choice,

JJ,

The Security Council shall, when it deems
necessary, call upon the parties to settle their
dispute by such means.
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1#

Any Member of the Dnlted Mat lone may bring
any dispute, or any situation of the nature
referred to in Article 3k to the attention of
the Security Council or of the General Assembly*

ARTIC&B XXXVIg
1#

The Security Council may at any stage of a
dispute of the nature referred to in Article 33
or of a situation of like nature, recommend
appropriate procedures or methods of adjust#
mentd

APPENDIX B
AETiCtSS OP THE CHARTER OP THE HA0ÜB CO»VBHTIOH
Number 8, X9Ô7
A R T I C M III
The laying of eutometie eontaet mlnea off the
coast and ports of the enemy with the sole object
of intercepting cmuaerclal shipping is forbidden.

miGM

VI
When anchored# automatic contact mines are employed#
every possible precaution must be taken for the
security of peaceful shipping.

#9 6 *

APPENDIX C
ARTICLES OF THE CHARTER OF THE IHTERHATIONAL
G OORT OP JUSTICE
ARTICLE XXVt
Th« Members of the Halted Hationa agree to agree
to accept and carry out the declalons of the
Security Council in accordance with the present
Charter#
ARTICLE XXXIt
If the Court Includes upon the bench a Judge of
the nationality of one of the parties, any other
party may choose a person to set as Judge# Such
person shall be chosen preferably from among those
persons who have been nominated as candidates#.#
ARTICLE XLl
1.

Cases are brought before the Court, as the
case may be, either by the notification of the
special agreement or by a written application
addressed to the Registrar. In either case
the subject of the dispute and the parties
shall be Indicated#

2#

The Registrar shall forthwith communicate the
application to all concerned#

3*

He shall notify the Members of the United Rations
through the Secretary General, and also any
other states entitled to appear before the Court#

ARTICLE LIII:
1#

Whenever one of the parties does not appear
before the Court, or falls to defend its case,
the other party may call upon the Court to
decide in favour of Its claim#

2#

The Court must, before doing so, satisfy Itself,
not only that it has Jurisdiction In accordance
with Articles 36 and 37# but also that the
claim Is well founded in fact and law#
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